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3 
Abstract 
 
The international community’s speedy and decisive response to Gaddafi’s brutal 
oppression of innocent civilians raised new optimism for effective cooperation in 
humanitarian protection. However, as the situation unravelled it became clear 
that the way Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was implemented in Libya it 
appeared to have confirmed the long-standing suspicions of several non-western 
nations, who often perceived that the doctrine may be used as a pretext for 
regime change. The crisis also highlighted the problem of the United Nation’s 
decision making process regarding the use of coercive action and the 
consequences of not assuming post-intervention Responsibility to Rebuild in 
conflict prone areas. This thesis evaluates the problems associated with NATO’s 
military intervention in Libya to draw upon the lessons that can be learnt for the 
doctrine of R2P. In addition, it also analyses how the international community 
has moved forward with these lessons. By examining the ‘Responsibility while 
Protecting’ and the ‘Code of Conduct’, the thesis argues that even though these 
two initiatives were significant developments, the international community has 
not yet learnt their lessons regarding R2P’s proper implementation for 
humanitarian protection missions. The thesis concludes with the suggestion that 
the use of force in global politics can sometimes be necessary and hence, future 
military interventions for humanitarian protection must be based on the 
criterions provided by the Just War Tradition (as specified in the original ICISS 
report), which will strengthen and legitimise R2P’s present framework. 
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Introduction 
 
The case of Libya demonstrates both the promises and the limitations 
associated with the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as a call for 
military intervention for humanitarian protection purposes. On the 17th of 
March 2011, the United Nations (UN) authorised military intervention in 
Libya to protect the country’s civilians against Gaddafi’s widespread brutal 
attacks. However, as bad as Libya’s human rights situation was under 
Gaddafi’s rule, it has only gotten worse since the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) coalition ousted him in 2011. The country ruled by a 
dictator - Muammar Gaddafi for almost 42 years, has now transformed 
into a failed state due to the constant feud for power between rival 
militants associated with the various local, tribal, regional, Islamist and 
criminal factions. Moreover, after Gaddafi’s fall the vacuum of weak 
government control left behind has proven to be advantageous for the ISIS 
(Islamic State of Iraq and al-sham)1 who have not only established a 
stronghold in different parts of the region but “are also using Libya as a 
platform for their resurgence”.2 Consequently, Libya has become a safe 
haven for militias affiliated with both al-Qaeda and ISIS. This all occurs 
“amidst a backdrop of widespread rape, extrajudicial killings, forcible 
disappearances and torture that complete the picture of a state that is 
1 “A group based in the Middle East, mainly in Iraq and Syria, who have extreme religious beliefs. They use 
brutal violence against anyone that does not agree with their views.” They are now listed as one of the top 
terrorist groups of the world. See, BBC Newsround,"Guide: What is Islamic State?", March 23, 2017, accessed 
August 8, 2017, http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/34965297. 
2 Daily Mail Australia, "ISIS digs its claws into Libya: Terror group 'is using chaotic country as a platform for its 
resurgence' after being chased of Iraqi and Syrian strongholds ,"  August 1, 2017, accessed August 3, 2017, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4747018/ISIS-using-chaotic-Libya-platform-resurgence.html. 
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failed to the bone.”3 Juxtaposing these facts with the international 
community’s responsibility to protect civilians against mass atrocities, 
NATO’s military intervention in Libya has renewed the debate over R2P’s 
proper implementation.  
 
The significance of Libya for the evaluation of R2P 
 
In response to Gaddafi’s brutal crackdown on innocent civilians, the UN 
Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 1973 on the 17th of March 2011, 
allowing the international community to use ‘all necessary measures’ for 
humanitarian protection. Since the passage of the resolution and the 
subsequent military intervention, debates around the international 
community’s responsibility to protect have grown exponentially. 
Policymakers and scholars have formulated different judgements about 
what Libya entailed for the doctrine of R2P. The director of the Global 
Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Dr Adams, described Libya as a 
“key turning point in the history of R2P, where the debates shifted from 
battle around ideas to a battle around implementation”.4 According to 
Evans, “Libya proved to be almost a textbook illustration justifying R2P 
principles.”5 In much of the literature on R2P and Libya, scholars 
3 Garikai Chengu, "Libya: From Africa’s Richest State Under Gaddafi, to Failed State After NATO Intervention," 
Global Research, September 14, 2016, accessed August 4, 2017, https://www.globalresearch.ca/libya-from-
africas-richest-state-under-gaddafi-to-failed-state-after-nato-intervention/5408740. 
4 Interview with Harvard Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, New York, November 2014, as quoted in, Sarah 
Brockmeier, Oliver Stuenkel, and Marcos Tourinho, "The Impact of the Libya Intervention Debates on Norms of 
Protection," Global Society 30, no. 1 (2015): 113. 
5 Ramesh Thakur, "R2P after Libya and Syria: Engaging Emerging Powers," The Washington Quarterly 36, no. 
2 (2013): 61. 
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acknowledge that the Libyan case represents an unprecedented moment in 
the history of the UNSC and R2P, particularly Resolution 1973, as it was 
the first time that the Council explicitly authorised the use of force against 
the will of a functioning government. Along these lines, Williams has 
highlighted the previous failures of the UNSC to take military action 
against the consent of a ruling government and considers the Libyan crisis 
as an important stepping-stone for the doctrine. He argued that the UNSC 
“entered a new political terrain with Resolution 1973: going to war against 
a regime with the stated aim of protecting civilians.”6 These arguments 
imply that the Libyan case is extremely significant for a critical analysis of 
the R2P doctrine. Before delving into these discussions further, it is 
important to outline the context of the doctrine’s formulation. 
The term R2P, first coined in 2001 by the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), came about as a conscious 
effort to provide guidance to the debates over humanitarian intervention 
and transform the contentious ‘right to intervene notion’ to the less 
controversial idea of  ‘sovereignty as a responsibility to protect’.7 The R2P 
doctrine not only outlines the “thresholds of suffering beyond which the 
norm of non-intervention would give way to the exercise of international 
responsibilities, but it also legitimizes coercive action for humanitarian 
6 Paul D. Williams, "The Road to Humanitarian War in Libya," Global Responsibility to Protect 3 (2011): 249. 
7 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, “The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty”, Canada: International Development 
Research Centre (2011), as quoted in, Andrew Garwood-Gowers, "The Responsibility to Protect and the Arab 
Spring: Libya as the exception, Syria as the Norm?" UNSW Law Journal 36, no. 2 (July 2013): 597. 
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purposes as an option of last resort.”8 However, from the outset, the 
dimension of military intervention under R2P’s premise was a point of 
major concern for many countries, particularly non-Western nations that 
regarded the principle of non-interference as essential to safeguarding 
their sovereignty. These countries were sceptical as they feared that the 
doctrine might be used by powerful Western states for the pursuit of other 
strategic or political objectives. In order to mitigate such fears and garner 
support for R2P, the formulators of the doctrine espoused a diplomatic 
strategy of shifting the emphasis to less contentious elements of the 
doctrine, namely prevention and state assistance.9  
Just War Theory and Humanitarian Intervention 
Within the discipline of International Relations (IR), the debate around 
humanitarian interventions and the use of coercive action has long 
revolved around the Just War Theory, and the ethical virtues of warfare. 
War, Augustine suggested, “is only legitimate when a wrong has been 
perpetrated by the opposing side, a wrong so grievous that neither the 
wrongdoer nor their victims would be well served by leniency.”10 The Just 
War Theory therefore, offers a moral casuistry necessary for military 
interventions and imposes certain limits on the conduct of war. Although 
8 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, “The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty”, Canada: International Development 
Research Centre (2011), as quoted in Time Dunne and Jess Gifkins, "Libya and the state of intervention," 
Australian Journal of International Affairs 65, no. 5 (2011): 518. 
9Andrew Garwood-Gowers, "The BRICS and the Responsibility to Protect: Lessons from the Libyan and Syrian 
Crisis," Responsibility to Protect in Theory and Practice Conference 2013, 305. 
10 David D. Corey and J. Daryl Charles, The just war tradition: An introduction (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 
2012), as quoted in Zamaris Saxon and Lara Pratt, "From Cause to Responsibility: R2P as a Modern Just War," 
The University of Notre Dame Australia Law Review 17, no. 7 (2015): 140. 
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classical studies of the Just War Theory initially identified two criterions 
for judging the morality of war - the reasons for going to war (jus ad 
bellum) and the means of conducting warfare (jus in bello) - subsequent 
developments in the theoretical field have since assigned equal importance 
to the justice in the aftermath of war (jus post bellum).11 The modern just 
war theory is placed in an “international community compound by states, 
which are legitimate to conduct war only in case of aggression.”12 As 
Walzer mentions, the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity are 
sacrosanct: “any use of force or imminent threat of force by one state 
against the political sovereignty or territorial integrity of another 
constitutes aggression and is a criminal act.”13 
Walzer’s work was seminal in reinvigorating the discussion of Just War 
Theory in IR but contemporary scholars such as McMahan and Wheeler 
have further developed the revisionist approach. In his analysis, McMahan 
highlights and defends various implications of the revisionist conception 
of the Just War Theory – “that a just cause is necessary for the satisfaction 
of any of the other conditions of a just war, that there can be various just 
causes for war other than defence against aggression and that both sides in 
a war can have a just cause.”14 His understanding of a just war is not 
11 “Under the first heading the theory sets a number of conditions; the most important by far is that the cause for 
which a state goes to war be just. Under the second heading, the paramount principle is that only legitimate 
targets (soldiers and a nar rowly circumscribed class of civilians) may be deliberately attacked.” as quoted in 
Igor Primoratz, "Michael Walzer's Just War Theory: Some Issues of Responsibility," Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice 5, no. 2 (2002): 222. 
12 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustration, 3rd ed. (New York: 
Basic Books, 2002), as quoted in, Alexandru Ioan Cuza, "The Responsibility to Protect: A just war theory based 
analysis," SEA - Practical Application of Science, 5th ser., 2, no. 3 (2014): 343. 
13 ibid. 
14 Jeff McMahan, "Just Cause for War," Ethics & International Affairs 19, no. 3 (2005):1-10. 
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limited to the classical moral justification of a war but goes much beyond 
it. In a similar vein, Wheeler also suggests that “it is  misleading to think of 
Just War theory as a check-list for political and military leaders 
contemplating the use of force.”15 He develops on the understanding of the 
American Bishops who believe that “the Just War Theory does not provide 
a set of mechanical criteria that automatically yields a simple answer, but a 
way of moral reasoning to discern the ethical limits of action.”16 With these 
caveats, Wheeler identifies “six substantive principles that should be 
applied when judging the humanitarian credentials of particular cases of 
intervention- just cause, last resort, good over harm, proportionality, right 
intention and reasonable prospect.”17 
This cognitive context of the classical and revisionist just war theory 
contributed to the development of the R2P doctrine. The ICISS Report’s 
six-fold criteria for intervention, namely right authority, just cause, right 
intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects, 
directly reflect the principles of the Just War Theory, which include just 
cause, right intention, proper authority, last resort, probability of success, 
and proportionality.18 However, even though these principles provide an 
important benchmark for justifying military interventions for 
15 Nicholas J. Wheeler, "Legitimating Humanitarian Intervention: Principles and Procedures," Melbourne 
Journal of International Law 2 (2001):554. 
16 Hugh Beach, 'Secessions, Interventions and Just War Theory', Pugwash Occasional Papers, 1999, 35-6, as 
quoted in Nicholas J. Wheeler, "Legitimating Humanitarian Intervention: Principles and Procedures," 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 2 (2001):554. 
17 Nicholas J. Wheeler, "Legitimating Humanitarian Intervention: Principles and Procedures," Melbourne 
Journal of International Law 2 (2001):554. 
18 Amitav Acharya, "The R2P and Norm Diffusion: Towards A Framework of Norm Circulation," Global 
Responsibility to Protect 5, no. 4 (2013): 474. 
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humanitarian protection purposes, they were excluded from both the 2005 
UN World Summit Outcome Document and the 2009 UN Secretary 
General’s Report on the doctrine of R2P. The aim of my thesis is to signify 
the appropriateness of the Just War Theory in lending guidance to R2P’s 
application. It does this by providing an empirical study on the use of force 
in Libya. 
This thesis seeks to answer the question “What practical lessons were 
learnt for the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect from the military 
intervention in Libya and how has the international community moved 
forward with these lessons?” In doing so, it attempts to recount the 
trajectory of the international community’s engagement with the norm 
during the Libyan crisis and seeks to analyse how the international 
community has responded to the lessons learnt from NATO’s military 
intervention in 2011. The thesis unfolds in four parts and advances four 
main arguments that support the central conclusion, namely that, the 
international community has not yet learned their lessons for R2P’s proper 
implementation in future mass atrocity situations. First, it briefly 
discusses the course of the UNSC’s invocation of R2P in Libya and 
describes the differences in opinion regarding the scope of the operation. 
It argues that the speedy decision to intervene in Libya came about due to 
the weaknesses of the Council’s decision-making process and therefore, 
stresses upon the need for a careful analysis of complex situations prior to 
 
11 
authorising coercive actions. Second, it assesses NATO’s advancement 
with its military operations in Libya and highlights the controversies that 
erupted in the political arena due to its actions. It argues that NATO 
overstepped the UN mandate by supporting the rebels and demanding 
regime change. Henceforth, proper implementation of R2P requires the 
establishment of greater accountability mechanisms for those undertaking 
military interventions to ensure that they follow the mandate specified 
under the doctrine. Third, it explores NATO’s post-intervention role and 
its subsequent departure without fulfilling its ‘Responsibility to Rebuild’ 
(R2R) in Libya. It further advocates that the intervening actors cannot 
ignore the R2R aspect of R2P as specified in the ICISS report. Fourth, the 
thesis analyses the initiatives taken by the international community after 
R2P’s implementation in Libya and examines if they have really learnt 
their lessons from the military intervention in 2011. The paper concludes 
by stating that even though some important developments emerged as a 
consequence of the Libyan intervention, the international community has 
not learnt their lessons regarding R2P’s proper implementation for 
humanitarian protection missions. The use of force in global politics can 
sometimes be necessary and hence, future military interventions for 
humanitarian protection must be based on the criterions provided by the 
Just War Theory (as highlighted in the original ICISS report), which will 
strengthen and legitimise R2P’s current framework.  
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Chapter I: The Problem of Decision Making 
 
In 2011, political protests flared up in different parts of the country 
demanding democratic reforms and the removal of the Libyan strongman 
Muammar al-Gaddafi, following closely upon the political upheavals 
associated with the ‘Arab Spring’. However, unlike in other regions, the 
protests in Libya that initially began as peaceful anti-government 
demonstrations quickly escalated into an armed conflict-partly because of 
Gaddafi’s decision to suppress the uprising through brutal means and 
partly because of the rapid consolidation of an armed opposition group, 
the Interim National Transitional Council (NTC).19 The threat to civilians 
from Gaddafi’s regime became explicit through his speeches in which he 
urged his supporters to attack the “cockroaches”20 protesting against his 
rule. He vowed to exterminate anyone who posed a danger to the unity of 
his state and declared that he would “cleanse Libya house by house”.21 In 
order to stay in power, the Libyan leader further made clear his intent to 
commit grave human rights violations by announcing that his forces would 
show “no mercy” towards the protestors.22 
 
 
 
19 Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, "The new politics of protection? Côte d'Ivoire, Libya and the 
responsibility to protect," International Affairs 87, no. 4 (2011): 838. 
20 BBC News, "Libya protests: Defiant Gaddafi refuses to quit," February 22, 2011, , accessed August 4, 2017, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12544624. 
21 ibid. 
22 CBS News, "Qaddafi vows "no mercy" as U.N. eyes action”, March 17, 2011, accessed August 4, 2017, 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/qaddafi-vows-no-mercy-as-un-eyes-action/. 
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The course of the Libyan Intervention 
 
In the wake of Gaddafi’s brutal crackdown against innocent civilians, the 
international community and several regional and sub-regional bodies 
realised that urgent action was needed to curb the activities of the Libyan 
government. On the 22nd of February, the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Navi Pillay, called upon the Libyan authorities to stop their 
violent attacks against protestors, which “may amount to crimes against 
humanity”.23 Upon investigating the situation in Libya, the Human Rights 
Council recommended suspending Libya’s membership from the council 
and stressed the international community’s responsibility to undertake an 
ameliorative action to provide humanitarian protection to the innocent 
civilians. Furthermore, the unpopularity of Gaddafi’s regime in the Arab 
World motivated key regional organisations such as the Arab League, the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC) to denounce the violence in Libya and subsequently 
suspend Libya’s membership from their respective organisations.24  
 
The international community’s condemnation of Gaddafi’s actions and the 
robust stance adopted by these regional organisations set the stage for the 
UNSC’s discussions on the Libyan situation. On the 25th of February 2011, 
the UNSC acted with unusual speed by unanimously adopting Resolution 
23 Alex J. Bellamy, "Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm," Ethics & 
International Affairs 25, no. 03 (2011): 264. 
24 Andrew Garwood-Gowers, "The Responsibility to Protect and the Arab Spring: Libya as the Exception, Syria 
as the Norm?" UNSW Law Journal 36, no. 2 (2013): 608. 
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1970, that referred to “widespread and systematic attacks… against the 
civilian population”25 and reminded Libya of its “responsibility to protect 
its population.”26 The resolution further imposed sanctions, arms 
embargo, travel bans and referred the matter to the International Criminal 
Court (ICC).27 Despite the Council’s adoption of Resolution 1970, the 
Gaddafi regime did not cease its hostile actions and the violence between 
the armed opposition and the security forces continued to escalate.  
 
The deteriorating situation in Libya made the regional organisations even 
more vocal in their approach. Condemning the state-sponsored violence, 
the GCC called upon the UNSC to “take all necessary measures to protect 
civilians, including enforcing a no-fly zone over Libya”.28 A similar 
position was echoed by the OIC as it endorsed the creation of a no-fly zone 
over Libya although, it explicitly debarred foreign military operations on 
the ground.29 In a dramatic turn of events, even the Arab League declared 
that the Gaddafi regime had lost all legitimacy and encouraged the UNSC 
members to “immediately impose a no-fly zone over the Libyan aviation, 
to provide the Libyan people with urgent, continuing support and, 
necessary protection from the serious violations and grave humanitarian 
crimes committed by the Libyan authorities.”30 
 
25 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1970, UN Doc S/RES/1970, 26th February 2011. 
26 ibid. 
27 ibid. 
28 Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, "The new politics of protection? Côte d'Ivoire, Libya and the 
responsibility to protect," International Affairs 87, no. 4 (2011): 841. 
29 ibid. 
30 ibid. 
 
15 
                                                 
Following the discussions on the Libyan crisis and the ‘gatekeeping’31 role 
played by the regional organisations, the UNSC invoked R2P and passed 
Resolution 1973 on the 17th of March 2013.32 The resolution was approved 
with ten votes in favour and five abstentions from Brazil, Russia, India, 
China (BRIC) and Germany.33 The representatives of BRIC and Germany 
were forthright in expressing their hostility to any sort of direct external 
involvement in the domestic affairs of Libya. While China and Russia 
stressed the need to resolve the Libyan crisis through peaceful means, the 
remaining countries were rather suspicious of NATO’s intentions due to 
the lack of clarity about the enforcement measures specified under 
Resolution 1973. Nonetheless, despite their objections, the BRIC members 
and Germany abstained from the resolution as they feared that blocking a 
resolution would attract significant criticism given the immediacy and 
gravity of threats to Libyan civilians, and they believed that they could not 
legitimize inaction in the face of mass atrocities.34 Ultimately, the adoption 
of Resolution 1973 led to establishment of a ‘no-fly zone' and authorised 
the member states to take ‘all necessary measures’ to protect the civilians 
of Libya.35 Within a few days after the resolution was passed, a coalition of 
states under NATO’s control began military air operations against Libyan 
targets.  
 
31 ibid. 
32 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1973, UN Doc S/RES/1973, 17th March 2011. 
33 ibid. 
34 Alex J. Bellamy, "Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm," Ethics & 
International Affairs 25, no. 03 (2011): 267. 
35 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1973, UN Doc S/RES/1973, 17th March 2011. 
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Resolution 1973 was lauded by many supporters of R2P as a significant 
step towards the consolidation of the doctrine’s normative standing.36 The 
U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, hailed the swiftness of the 
UNSC’s action by stating: “I can’t remember a time in recent memory 
when the Council has acted so swiftly, so decisively, and in unanimity on 
an urgent matter of international human rights.”37 In a similar vein, 
Nuruzzaman also hailed the decision to authorise military intervention by 
asserting that the UNSC’s quick response to the Libyan crisis surprised 
many people primarily because, for an unexpectedly long time, human 
sufferings in Bahrain, Syria and Yemen continued to be ignored.38  For the 
then UN Secretary General, Ban Ki- moon, Resolution 1973 clearly and 
unequivocally affirmed “the international community’s determination to 
fulfil its responsibility to protect civilians from violence perpetrated upon 
them by their own government.”39 According to Bellamy and Williams, the 
Libyan situation served as an unparalleled juncture in the history of the 
UNSC and the passing of Resolution 1973 by the Council members showed 
that “they would not be inhibited as a matter of principle from authorizing 
enforcement for humanitarian protection purposes even in the absence of 
36 Jocelyn Vaughn and Tim Dunne, "Leading from the front: America, Libya and the localisation of 
R2P," Cooperation and Conflict 50, no. 1 (2014): 18. 
37 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, ‘Remarks by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative 
to the United Nations, at the Security Council Stakeout, on Resolution 1970, Libya Sanctions’, 26 February 2011, 
http://usun.state.gov/remarks/4983, as quoted in Nathalie Tocci, "On Power and Norms: Libya, Syria and the 
Responsibility to Protect," Global Responsibility to Protect 8, no. 1 (2016): 54. 
38 Mohammed Nuruzzaman, "The “Responsibility to Protect” Doctrine: Revived in Libya, Buried in 
Syria," Insight Turkey 15, no. 2 (2013):63. 
39United Nations Secretary-General, ‘Secretary-General Says Security Council Action on Libya Affirms 
International Community’s Determination to Protect Civilians from Own Government’s Violence’, 18 March 
2011. Available at: http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/ sgsm13454.doc.htm, as quoted by Christopher Hobson, 
"Responding to Failure: The Responsibility to Protect after Libya," Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies 44, no. 3 (2016): 443. 
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host state consent.”40 Likewise, Chris Keeler described the UNSC’s 
resolutions in Libya as a model for the future implementation of the R2P 
doctrine.41  
 
The problematic decision making process 
 
These optimistic prognoses surrounding Resolution 1973 were soon 
overshadowed by scholarly critiques of the rushed decision making process 
undertaken by the Council members. In his analysis, Hobson emphasized 
that the UNSC acted with extraordinary speed in authorizing military 
intervention during the Libyan crisis, which left limited space for the 
skeptics to challenge the context of the resolution.42 Moreover, the speed 
and haste espoused by the Council members led to defied expectations and 
judgements of the actual situation, and resulted in the transmogrification 
of an intervention - which was meant to stop an immanent humanitarian 
crisis - into something much more “expansive and consequential.”43 By 
acknowledging that the time frame to act in Libya was exceptionally short 
as none of the various risk-assessment frameworks mentioned the country 
posing any threat of mass atrocities, Bellamy argues that R2P’s 
implementation in Libya highlighted the problems of the UNSC’s quick 
and urgent decision making. He accentuated that “such late-in-the day 
40 Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, "The new politics of protection? Côte d'Ivoire, Libya and the 
responsibility to protect," International Affairs 87, no. 4 (2011): 825. 
41 Christopher Keeler, "The End of the Responsibility to Protect?" Foreign Policy Journal, 2011. 
42 Christopher Hobson, "Responding to Failure: The Responsibility to Protect after Libya," Millennium: Journal 
of International Studies 44, no. 3, (2013):443. 
43 ibid. 
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decisions about military intervention to prevent atrocities as carried out in 
Libya, will always be embedded with a deep uncertainty about their effects 
and will be driven by the specific political context.”44 According to 
Odeyemi, the speed with which the P3 (France, UK, US) authorised the use 
of military force as a means to resolve the Libyan crisis through Resolution 
1973, raised serious concerns among non-western countries, particularly 
the BRICS, who began to question the motives of the coalition.45 
Combined, these arguments suggest that the swiftness of the UNSC’s 
decision to intervene in Libya hindered an accurate decision making 
process; narrowed the members’ ability to comprehend the complex 
realities of the situation and reflect on their own mental or physical 
limitations to predict certain consequences. In sum, the decision to use 
force under the name of humanitarian protection requires a more careful 
and cautious reckoning, one which enables external actors to take into 
consideration the possible consequences of their actions. As strongly 
suggested by the Libyan case, the failure to develop this approach can have 
very real and devastating consequences for people in mass atrocity 
situations.  
 
A second line of criticism has been raised by those who directly challenge 
the existing practices of the UNSC’s decision making process that allowed 
the P3 members to push for a hard solution to the Libyan crisis. A practice 
44 Alex J. Bellamy, "Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm," Ethics & 
International Affairs 25, no. 03 (2011): 269. 
45 Christo Odeyemi, "R2P intervention, BRICS countries, and the no-fly zone measure in Libya," Cogent Social 
Sciences 2, no. 1 (2016): 13. 
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that has come under increasing reproval is the informal ‘pen-holding’ role 
adopted by a few powerful countries through which they take upon 
themselves the responsibility to frame a particular issue, draft resolutions 
and carve out a future course of action before consulting others. The UK 
quickly imposed itself as the “lead country” or the “pen-holder” as far as 
matters on Libya were concerned and devised resolutions according to 
their competence.46 As a result, the UN resolutions on Libya were mostly 
an outcome of informal consultations between British and French 
diplomats. Only once the draft was approved by London and Paris did it 
get passed on to the American and non-permanent European members of 
the Council (Germany and Portugal). After the US approved the draft it 
was shared with the other P5 members (China and Russia) and then, 
finally, with the rest of the Council members. Ultimately, the other 
members would just fine-tune the British Draft, without making any major 
changes that might have seemed necessary.47 
Through its ‘pen-holding’ role the UK managed to twist UN procedures to 
their advantage in order to garner support for the intervention in Libya. As 
Adler-Nissen and Vincent Pouliot explain, the competence of the British 
diplomats allowed them to exploit the defection of Libyan Deputy 
Permanent Representative Ibrahim Dabbashi; table the draft resolutions 
early; and accelerate the negotiation process to avoid the formulation of 
46 Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Vincent Pouliot, "Power in practice: Negotiating the international intervention in 
Libya," European Journal of International Relations 20, no. 4 (2014): 898. 
47 ibid. 
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counter blocs.48 Furthermore, the British diplomats sought to establish 
their moral authority through “press harassment” and “media leakages”, 
which were designed to pressurise the apprehensive states to move away 
from their resistant positions and instead, provide a smooth passage for 
the authorisation of military intervention in Libya. It was due to this 
‘mastery of the UN procedures’ that the P3 were able to persuade South 
Africa to vote in favour of Resolution 1973 and disarm its opponents - 
Russia and China.49 The pressure imposed by the P3 members to act in 
Libya impeded the Council’s careful consideration of whether military 
intervention was really the most appropriate course of action or whether 
other options were perhaps more advisable. In addition, the dominant 
position of the P3 members restricted the Council’s ability to develop a 
practical solution for humanitarian protection in Libya and caused them to 
overlook the repeated offers for peaceful negotiation proposed by different 
agencies (as discussed in chapter II).  
The influence exercised by the UK and France further allowed them to 
limit the level of input that non-P3 members could have in the negotiation 
process regarding Resolution 1973 and led to the marginalization of the 
remaining elected members of the Council. This inconsistency of the 
UNSC’s decision making process has been underlined by Ralph and 
Gifkins, who argue that the decision to intervene in Libya was a result of 
“weak and unsustainable consensus, and symptomatic of the exclusionary 
48 ibid. 
49 ibid p.891. 
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hierarchies that are deeply ingrained within the UNSC practices.”50 
Developing this argument, they state that the P3-dominated ‘pen-holding’ 
practice exacerbates the difficulties of formulating a collective approach to 
decision making which, in turn, has very real implications for the UNSC’s 
response to humanitarian crisis situations. Ralph and Gifkins emphasize 
that the proper implementation of R2P requires policy makers operating 
under the new normative environment “to align what they see as the most 
feasible response to mass atrocity with the need to construct and sustain a 
collective cosmopolitan consciousness that underpins the core ethic of 
protection.”51 As they explain, a collective consciousness for protection 
purposes and the full involvement of other Council members in the 
negotiation process can possibly limit the ability of the P3 to pursue their 
own goals, and shift the focus towards the protection of civilians. 
In accordance with these criticisms, this chapter suggests that the 
fundamental problem associated with R2P’s implementation in Libya was 
not so much about the quick decision making but the poor decision 
making and the power politics of the UNSC. The P3 members exploited 
their power to push for the adoption of Resolution 1973 however, their 
decisions were based on inadequate information and fell short of a proper 
counterfactual analysis. Libya lacked the structural conditions necessary to 
transition to democracy; rebel forces were not united; and there were 
50 Jason Ralph and Jess Gifkins, "The purpose of United Nations Security Council practice: Contesting 
competence claims in the normative context created by the Responsibility to Protect," European Journal of 
International Relations 23, no. 3 (2017): 643. 
51 ibid p. 632. 
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considerable dangers involved in removing Gaddafi.52 As mentioned 
elsewhere, the global risk-assessment framework failed to report the 
country as committing grave human rights violations and hence, from the 
onset of the crisis, the Council lacked sufficient knowledge about the 
situation in Libya. In one of the procedural discussions about the Libyan 
problem, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon “stressed on the accounts 
provided by the press, human rights groups, and civilians that included 
allegations of indiscriminate force, arbitrary arrests, targeting of peaceful 
protesters, detention and torture of members that belonged to the 
opposition group, and the use of foreign fighters.”53 But he also added that 
though these reports seem to be credible and consistent, “there was a lack 
of conclusive proof.”54 This statement demonstrates his uncertainty and 
hesitation in sanctioning military intervention in the light of deficient 
information about the local Libyan context. It further reveals the lack of 
investigations that went into the P3-dominated decision making process. 
Although the matter was referred to the ICC, which claimed that mass 
humanitarian atrocities were being conducted by the Gaddafi regime 
against innocent civilians, the policy makers lacked adequate 
understanding of the social and political dynamics that governed Libya.  
52Christopher Hobson, "Responding to Failure: The Responsibility to Protect after Libya," Millennium: Journal 
of International Studies 44, no. 3 (2016): 450. 
53 Jeffrey Bachman, "R2P’s “Ulterior Motive Exemption” and the Failure to Protect in Libya," Politics and 
Governance 3, no. 4 (2015):58. 
54United Nations, Security Council. Peace and security in Africa, S/PV.6490, 2011. Retrieved from 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?sy mbol=S/PV.6490, as quoted in, Jeffrey Bachman, "R2P’s 
“Ulterior Motive Exemption” and the Failure to Protect in Libya," Politics and Governance 3, no. 4 (2015):58. 
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The Council failed to take into consideration the nature of the Jamahiriya 
and the complex system of governance that Gaddafi had built. During his 
42 years in power, Gaddafi developed his own political philosophy that 
was based on absolute intolerance of defiant and nonconformist opinions 
and the eradication of any vestiges of constitutionality, civil society rights, 
and authentic political participation. With absolutely no or minimal rights 
for the ordinary Libyan masses, Gaddafi’s power structure was based on an 
ultra-hierarchical pyramid where Gaddafi’s family and close allies were 
placed at the top. Their authority, defended by a brutal security apparatus, 
often went unchecked and invariably uncontested. As Gaddafi’s 
authoritarian rule endured for over four decades, Libyan society was 
unable to develop democratic political structures or institutions which 
would allow the country to transition into a democratic state. In addition, 
the advocates of war also fell short of understanding the societal divisions 
that were ensuing in Libya. The absence of a clear distinction between the 
state and the regime frustrated the army and security personnel belonging 
to the Gaddafi regime, and made it difficult for them to stay neutral during 
the rebellion. This resulted in the defection of several regime military 
members to join the rebel forces and rebellion brigades that were largely 
composed of civilians such as teachers, students, workers, and lawyers - all 
revolting for their own individual interests. At the same time, 
fragmentations also occurred along tribal and regional lines. Even the 
NTC, which was recognised as the de facto government of Libya by the 
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international community, failed to emerge as a unified front and lacked a 
coherent political vision.  
 
In light of these divisions and the lack of democratic structures within 
Libyan society, the collapse of the Gaddafi regime clearly came with the 
risk of precipitating a political vacuum in which competing factions would 
jostle for power and supremacy.55 Based upon these evidences one can 
argue that developing a collective approach on Libya and discussing the 
matter more openly with other non-permanent members of the Council 
would have led to the dissemination of information about the crisis; 
assisted the P3’s capability to develop alternative strategies to resolve the 
problem; and enabled them to better predict the outcome of their actions. 
The significance of information sharing has recently been acknowledged 
by the UN Security Council in its report, “Can the Security Council Prevent 
Conflict”, which notes that “the ability of the Council to receive frank and 
timely analysis and information is critical to its effective engagement on 
conflict prevention, mediation, management and resolution.”56  
 
The fallout from the Libyan intervention clearly indicates that the policy 
makers did in fact act hastily and with a lack of information. However, for 
the future implementation of R2P, it is important to understand the 
55 International Crisis Group ,"A Ceasefire and Negotiations: The Right Way to Resolve the Libya Crisis,"  March 
10, 2011, , https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/ceasefire-and-
negotiations-right-way-resolve-libya-crisis. 
56 United Nations Security Council, " Research Report: Can the Security Council Prevent Conflict", no. 1, (9th 
February 2011):11. 
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challenges they might have faced. The deliberations of policy makers 
regarding a response to the Libyan crisis were informed, on the one hand, 
by the horrors of past failures such as Rwanda 1994 and Srebrenica 1995 
and, on the other hand, by the rapidly deteriorating situation in Libya 
where civilians were being slaughtered on a large scale.57 The pressure of 
past failures and the present need to act, added to the sense of urgency 
that shaped the deliberations.  
To conclude, the major lesson that can be drawn from this analysis is that 
there are no easy or quick solutions to deal with such complex crises. 
While the norm has successfully cultivated the habit among the 
international community to respond to mass atrocity situations, the 
UNSC’s decision making process to implement R2P remains flawed. 
Unlike, Ralph and Gifkins58; Adler-Nissan and Pouliot59; and Hobson60 
who lay great emphasis on the underlying impulse to protect civilians that 
reflects changing international norms around humanitarian protection 
and provide alternative suggestions to implement R2P, this chapter 
suggests that a shift in the existing UNSC practices can bring about a 
substantive change in the way the international community responds to 
atrocity situations. The proper implementation of the R2P doctrine 
57 Christopher Hobson, "Responding to Failure: The Responsibility to Protect after Libya," Millennium: Journal 
of International Studies 44, no. 3 (2016): 446. 
58 ‘Competence for humanitarian Protection’ Jason Ralph and Jess Gifkins, "The purpose of United Nations 
Security Council practice: Contesting competence claims in the normative context created by the Responsibility 
to Protect," European Journal of International Relations 23, no. 3 (2017): 910. 
59 “A practice which equates diplomatic competence with the exercise of practical judgment that harmonizes a 
plurality of normative commitments”, as quoted in Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Vincent Pouliot, "Power in 
practice: Negotiating the international intervention in Libya," European Journal of International Relations 20, 
no. 4 (2014): 11. 
60 ‘Humble approach’ as described in Christopher Hobson, "Responding to Failure: The Responsibility to Protect 
after Libya," Millennium: Journal of International Studies 44, no. 3 (2016): 453. 
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therefore requires the establishment of better practices that will enable a 
collective approach for humanitarian protection. However, this will only 
be possible if the actions of the P3 members are critically scrutinised and 
the non-P3 members are fully involved in the deliberations over 
humanitarian protection. The P3 members need to step away from their 
dominant positions and formulate their decisions with the sole aim of 
protecting vulnerable populations. Humanitarian protection and only 
humanitarian protection should be the starting point of their analysis prior 
to authorising coercive intervention. This suggestion directly resonates 
with the jus ad bellum principle of the just war tradition, which renders 
that the belligerent states must have a just cause for combating coercive 
actions. In addition, there is also a need to develop effective early warning 
mechanisms within the UNSC with three main components: dissemination 
to information, the capability to undertake comprehensive analysis, and a 
communication channel to decision makers capable of authorising 
effective measures. 
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Chapter II: NATO overstepping the UN mandate 
 
After the initial stages of NATO’s military intervention in Libya, a new 
political controversy emerged among the UN members concerning the 
interpretation and implementation of R2P. The NATO coalition was widely 
criticized for what some states perceived as an overly expansive 
interpretation of Resolution 1973 since the intervening forces pursued a 
strategy of regime change by arming the rebels and attacking a broad 
range of targets beyond those necessary for the protection of civilians.61 In 
the context of these discussions, this chapter aims to analyze the way 
NATO comprehended and applied the ‘military dimension’ of R2P for 
humanitarian protection purposes in Libya. But before proceeding further, 
the important question is why would the powerful P3 call for regime 
change in a small country like Libya? According to the understanding of 
realist commentators, the NATO forces pursued these actions due to the 
potential “geo-political, economic and electoral advantages accruing to and 
within intervening member states.”62 With a population of 6.4 million and 
a territory of mostly empty desert, “Libya has taken on an outsized 
importance because of its geographic location, as it sits atop the strategic 
intersection of the Mediterranean, African and Arab worlds.”63 Therefore, 
control over Libya has always been an effective way to project power in 
61 Andrew Garwood-Gowers, "The Responsibility to Protect and the Arab Spring: Libya as the exception, Syria as 
the Norm?," UNSW Law Journal 36, no. 2 (July 2013): 609. 
62 Christopher Fermor, "NATO’s decision to intervene in Libya (2011): Realist principles or humanitarian 
norms?" Journal of Politics & International Studies 8 (2013): 323. 
63 Jason Pack, "Libya Is Too Big to Fail," Foreign Policy, March 18, 2011,accessed August 28, 2017, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/03/18/libya-is-too-big-to-fail/. 
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these places.64 Secondly, the country is hydrocarbon rich figuring in the 
top ten of world oil reserves and it additionally enjoys significant 
exploitable reserves of natural gas.65 The removal of Gaddafi from power, 
the West concluded, “would open up Libya as a huge market for oil and 
investments.”66 Lastly, Gaddafi’s regional unpopularity and NATO’s 
willingness to sustain its relationship with Arab and African leaders made 
Gaddafi’s removal a priority.  
 
NATO’s intentions behind the Libyan intervention 
 
The debate about where the political and strategic motive of regime change 
fits among NATO’s early set of priorities still remains unresolved, however, 
the fact that R2P became a tool for bringing about regime change in Libya 
does not. There is ample evidence proving that even if the predominant 
intention behind NATO’s military intervention in Libya was to protect 
civilians, gradually its aim evolved to overthrow the Gaddafi regime. This 
view has been supported by Zifcak, who claims that the NATO strategy 
“morphed progressively” into one that embraced regime change. 67 In fact, 
after repeatedly rejecting the idea that the Libyan intervention should 
embrace regime change, witnessing the mass humanitarian atrocities 
64ibid. 
65 “Proven natural gas reserves in 2006 were estimated to be 1.42 billion cubic meters, the third largest in Africa, 
and some experts suggested unexplored reserves could double that figure (World Bank 2006: 13)”, as quoted in 
Christopher Fermor, "NATO’s decision to intervene in Libya (2011): Realist principles or humanitarian norms?" 
Journal of Politics & International Studies 8 (2013): 11. 
66 Mohammed Nuruzzaman, "The “Responsibility to Protect” Doctrine: Revived in Libya, Buried in 
Syria," Insight Turkey 15, no. 2 (2013): 63. 
67 Spencer Zifcak, "The Responsibility to Protect after Libya and Syria," Melbourne Journal of International 
Law 13 (2012): 66. 
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carried out by the Gaddafi government, President Obama later enunciated 
the altered objective, saying that, “Gaddafi’s belligerence posed an ongoing 
threat to citizens throughout the rest of Libya and the long term stability of 
Libya required his removal.”68 Similar views were upheld by the leaders of 
France and Great Britain. In a joint statement, President Barak Obama, 
Prime Minister David Cameron, and President Nicolas Sarkozy committed 
to pursue coercive action in Libya until the Colonel was removed.69 They 
further remarked that “it was impossible to imagine a future of Libya with 
Gaddafi in power and hence, Gaddafi must go and go for good.”70 In doing 
so, they also acknowledged the restrictions imposed by the UN mandate as 
they clearly stated, "our duty and our mandate under the Resolution 1973 
is to protect civilians, and we are doing that.”71 This statement signifies 
that the NATO members respected the principles of R2P, however, they 
saw regime change to be the only and the best option to resolve the crisis. 
Moreover, the policy makers were confronted with severe challenges as 
described in Chapter I (failures to act in the past and mass atrocities in 
Libya) that led to the hard choice of first using coercion and then bringing 
about regime change in Libya. This does not necessarily mean that the 
NATO members invoked R2P in Libya as a ‘self-serving military 
68 John Western and Joshua S. Goldstein, "R2P After Syria," Foreign Affairs, 2013. See also The White House, 
"President Obama's Speech on Libya," news release, March 28, 2011, accessed September 2, 2017, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cVW6jBbD5Q8. 
69 Allegra Startton, "Obama, Cameron and Sarkozy: no let-up in Libya until Gaddafi departs," The Guardian, 
April 15, 2011, accessed September 5, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/15/obama-sarkozy-
cameron-libya. 
70President Obama, David Cameron, and Nicolas Sarkozy, "Libya’s Pathway to Peace," The New York Times, 
April 14, 2011, accessed September 5, 2017, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/opinion/15iht-
edlibya15.html?mcubz=0&module=ArrowsNav&contentCollection=Opinion&action=keypress®ion=FixedLeft&
pgtype=article. 
71 ibid. 
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adventure’72 or in pursuit of their Western imperialistic policy. However, 
their demand for regime change and subsequent actions thereafter, raised 
suspicion among many that the doctrine could be abused for political 
purposes.  
 
Bachman, in his analysis, demonstrated resistance to the authorization of 
coercive action in conflict prone areas if the intervening states have 
motives other than those of humanitarian protection.73 According to him, 
NATO was able to demand regime change in Libya due to “ulterior motive 
exemption” of actors specified in the R2P doctrine. It is the utilisation of 
vague language in the principles of R2P that allows the intervening states 
to have motives other than civilian protection influencing their 
participation in an intervention, which he refers to as the “ulterior motive 
exemption”.74 While he directly challenges the framework of R2P, it is 
essential to understand that the problem in Libya was not principally 
about the intentions of the NATO members that led to the invocation of 
R2P or even with the structure of the doctrine, but it was the way NATO 
conducted its operations (as examined in the following paragraphs), which 
ultimately served as major setback for the doctrine. 
 
72 Elizabeth O’Shea, "Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in Libya: Ghosts of the Past Haunting the Future 
*," International Human Rights Law Review 1, no. 1 (2012): 190. 
73Jeffrey Bachman, "R2P’s “Ulterior Motive Exemption” and the Failure to Protect in Libya," Politics and 
Governance 3, no. 4 (2015): 65. 
74 ibid. pg.57. 
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NATO’s disregard of credible diplomatic options and buying 
time 
 
The aggravation of the crisis and the massive human rights violations 
carried out by the Gaddafi regime strengthened the NATO coalition’s 
resolve to overthrow the dictator. They became so determined on their 
stance that once they decided to commence their military operations, they 
ignored those proposing for a negotiated settlement to the Libyan crisis - 
particularly the African Union. Moreover, the coalition repeatedly stood in 
opposition to forging a ceasefire between the Gaddafi regime and the 
rebels.  
 
Within a few hours of the UNSC’s authorization to use ‘all necessary 
measures’ in Libya to protect civilians against mass atrocity crimes, the 
authoritarian leader became desperate to sustain his dictatorship. As a 
result, the Libyan government proclaimed their acceptance of the UN 
demands for a negotiated solution to the crisis and declared an immediate 
unilateral ceasefire as an attempt to crush the anti-Gaddafi revolt.75 
However, the NATO leaders believed that offers put forward by Gaddafi 
were merely to avoid international air strikes and thus, refused to accept 
his ceasefire proposal. Then in April 2011, the African Union (AU) initiated 
a reconciliation process, which involved a ceasefire and negotiation for 
75 Peter Goodspeed, "Peter Goodspeed: Gaddafi's ‘ceasefire’ aims to avoid air strikes," National Post, March 18, 
2011, accessed September 10, 2017, http://nationalpost.com/opinion/peter-goodspeed-gaddafis-ceasefire-aims-
to-avoid-air-strikes. 
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Libya’s better future. The plan “included the delivery of humanitarian aid, 
the protection of foreign nationals in Libya and dialogue between Libyan 
parties on the establishment of a transition period towards political 
reform.”76 While Gaddafi accepted the AU proposal for a political solution 
to the deadlocked two-month-old conflict, the rebels rejected the plan 
believing it to be a scheme to prolong Gaddafi’s leadership.77 The Obama 
administration reiterated the assertion of the rebels demanding Gaddafi’s 
departure as a precondition for any political settlement.78 Other western 
powers also dismissed the AU initiative. Another effort was made by the 
Libyan regime on the 26th of May 2o11, which offered not merely a 
ceasefire, but “negotiations toward a constitutional government and 
compensation to victims, yet the rebels demurred in favor of war.”79 The 
plan was once again greeted with skepticism by the NATO allies.80 
 
It was rather difficult for the international to community to endow their 
trust in the negotiation offers made by the autocratic tyrant who was 
responsible for the ruthless killing of thousands of innocent civilians. 
However, these proposals were fully consistent with Resolution 1973 and 
thus, they should have been taken into consideration by the UNSC 
76 Harriet Sherwood and Christian McGreal, "Libya: Gaddafi has accepted roadmap to peace, says Zuma," The 
Guardian, April 11, 2011, accessed September 11, 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/10/libya-african-union-gaddafi0-rebels-peace-talks. 
77 Barak Barfi, "Can Africa Really Help Libya Find Peace?" New Republic, April 13, 2011, accessed September 11, 
2017, https://newrepublic.com/article/86594/libya-nato-african-union-clinton. 
78 Leila Fadel, "Libyan rebels reject African Union cease-fire proposal," The Washington Post, April 11, 2011, 
accessed September 11, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/gaddafi-accepts-road-map-for-peace-
proposed-by-african-leaders/2011/04/10/AFbrtuJD_story.html?utm_term=.64ea37c45c8c. 
79 Martin Chula, "Libyan regime makes peace offer that sidelines Gaddafi," The Guardian, May 27, 2011, 
accessed September 11, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/may/26/libyan-ceasefire-offer-
sidelines-gaddafi. See also Alan J. Kuperman, "A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing NATOs Libya 
Campaign," International Security 38, no. 1 (2013): 115. 
80 ibid. 
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members during their deliberations over Libya instead of being out-rightly 
rejected.81 The ceasefire offers entailed the prospects of initiating a 
multilateral negotiation process between the regional or sub-regional 
organizations operating in Libya, the international community and the 
Gaddafi regime. It also offered an opportunity to alleviate mass 
humanitarian suffering across Libya. This analysis can be substantiated by 
Hobson’s argument, who states that, “even if negotiations subsequently 
failed, the pause would have allowed the NATO members to undertake a 
deeper reflection on the consequences of pushing ahead with military 
action and considering the full ramification of regime change.”82 
Furthermore, even the principles of R2P suggest appraising the credible 
diplomatic options prior to authorizing military intervention. The repeated 
ceasefire proposals revealed Gaddafi’s willingness to halt his actions and 
therefore, served as a good starting point for the NATO members to exploit 
their capabilities for a peaceful diplomatic solution.  
With their tepid response to ceasefire proposals and constant refusal to 
pursue diplomatic negotiations, the actions of the NATO members were no 
longer consistent with the humanitarian intent specified in the R2P 
doctrine. Consequently, allegations of “mission creep” 83 began to be raised 
against NATO’s military intervention in Libya.  
81 Jeffrey Bachman, "R2P’s “Ulterior Motive Exemption” and the Failure to Protect in Libya," Politics and 
Governance 3, no. 4 (2015): 60. 
82 Christopher Hobson, "Responding to Failure: The Responsibility to Protect after Libya," Millennium: Journal 
of International Studies 44, no. 3 (2016): 448. 
83 James Pattison, "The Ethics of Humanitarian Protection in Libya," Ethics & International Affairs 25, no. 3 
(2011): 273. 
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NATO’s operational conduct: Assistance to the rebels 
The expansion of NATO’s objective became evident when they provided 
preferential support to the rebels. The coalition did not only join the rebels 
in rejecting multiple ceasefire offers made by the Libyan government but 
also assisted them with battlefield intelligence, logistics and training 
support. As an effort to step up international pressure on the Gaddafi 
regime and to advance their strategy of bringing about regime change in 
Libya, Western and Arab countries pledged money to the rebels through a 
new funding mechanism - the Libyan contact group.84 In addition, the 
NATO coalition flouted the terms of the arms embargo specified in 
Resolution 1970 and 1973 by supplying weapons to the rebels. These 
financial and weaponry assistance efforts were supplemented by air-
strikes that destroyed government telecommunication installations and 
infrastructure; the headquarters of the Libyan army brigade; and military 
targets.85 In doing so, the NATO led coalition cut all sorts of 
communication between the government troops, which enabled the rebels 
to advance further.86  
 
The NATO coalition clearly overstepped the remits of the UN mandate by 
participating on the side of the rebels. First and foremost, the NATO allies 
were well aware that the rebel forces had allegedly committed acts that 
84 Joshua Thomas, Delegitimizing Sultanistic Regimes, One Step at a Time, Master's thesis, University of 
Connecticut, 2014, 10. 
85 Harriet Sherwood, "Libya regime accuses Nato of siding with rebels," The Guardian, April 20, 2011, accessed 
September 11, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/19/libya-regime-nato-rebels. 
86 ibid. 
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constituted war crimes and despite this knowledge they continued to 
provide the rebels with offensive military support in Libya’s civil war.87 
Considering that both sides, the Gaddafi forces and the rebels, were 
responsible for mass humanitarian crimes against civilians, the NATO 
forces should have maintained strict neutrality instead of supporting one 
side over the other. Secondly, in the absence of the support extended by 
the western powers, the rebel forces would not have been able to fight or 
maintain their positions against the government’s vastly superior forces 
for a very long time. Hence, one could assume that sooner or later, they 
would have agreed to the ceasefire offers and sought a more peaceful 
solution. These sentiments have been expressed by Prashad, who argues 
that, “NATO’s partisan bombardment allowed the rebels to seize the 
country faster than they might have had in a more protracted war, but it 
also allowed them carte blanche to continue with their own crimes against 
humanity.” 88  
NATO’s intervention escalated crimes against humanity 
The coalition’s preferential participation on the side of the rebels and its 
ruthless attacks on government establishments could be interpreted as an 
‘act of aggression.’89 This is because, the death toll in Libya when NATO 
87 Sarah Brockmeier, Oliver Stuenkel, and Marcos Tourinho, "The Impact of the Libya Intervention Debates on 
Norms of Protection," Global Society 30, no. 1 (2016): 125. 
88 Vijay Prashad, "NATO’S Craven Coverup of Its Libyan Bombing," CounterPunch, March 15, 2012, accessed 
September 12, 2017, https://www.counterpunch.org/2012/03/15/natos-craven-coverup-of-it-libyan-bombing/.  
See also, Jeffrey Bachman, "R2P’s “Ulterior Motive Exemption” and the Failure to Protect in Libya," Politics and 
Governance 3, no. 4 (2015): 62. 
89 “which is defined as the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to 
exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its 
 
36 
                                                 
intervened was perhaps around 1000-2000 (judging by the UN estimates) 
and eight months later it rose up to ten times that figure.90 As the NATO 
leaders refused ceasefire and negotiation offers, estimates of the number 
of dead increased from 10,000 up to 50,000.91 In late 2011 and early 2012, 
Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty International, the BBC and The 
New York Times conducted on the ground investigations of airstrike sites 
across Libya, which revealed the scores of civilian causalities by NATO 
bombings. The examination conducted by the New York Times found 
“credible accounts of dozens of civilians killed by NATO in many distinct 
attacks. The revelations also state that these figures are not a “complete 
accounting.”92  The Amnesty International report was only able to identify 
the deaths of 55 people, including 16 children and 14 women as a result of 
NATO’s bombings in Tripoli and the towns of Zliten, Majer, Sirte and 
Brega.93 In a similar analysis, the Human Rights Watch discovered a 
higher death toll and reported that, “the NATO air strikes killed 72 
civilians, one-third of them children under the age of 18.”94 Although the 
report acknowledges that “the overall loss of civilian life in NATO 
airstrikes demonstrates that precautions were generally taken, it also 
character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.” in 
International Criminal Court, “Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court”, 17th July 1998. 
90 Seumas Milne, "If the Libyan war was about saving lives, it was a catastrophic failure," The Guardian, October 
27, 2011, accessed September 14, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/oct/26/libya-war-
saving-lives-catastrophic-failure. 
91 ibid. 
92 C.J. Chivers and Eric Schmitt, "In Strikes on Libya by NATO, an Unspoken Civilian Toll," The New York 
Times, December 17, 2011, accessed September 11, 2017, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/world/africa/scores-of-unintended-casualties-in-nato-war-in-
libya.html?mcubz=0. 
93 Amnesty International, Libya Human Rights Abuses continue as Country descends into Chaos. May 2015, 1-
17. See also: Al-Jazeera,"NATO 'ignoring civilian deaths in Libya'," March 15, 2012, accessed September 13, 
2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/05/201251416321904479.html. 
94 Human Rights Watch, "Unacknowledged Deaths Civilian Casualties in NATO’s Air Campaign in Libya", 
(United States of America,2012),4. 
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highlights that military interventions cannot be indiscriminate or cause 
disproportionate civilian loss.”95 In its defense, NATO put forward the 
argument that it only targeted areas with military establishments. 
However, HRW’s investigations have raised “questions about whether 
these areas struck were valid military targets at the time of attack.”96 The 
NATO allies failed to acknowledge these causalities or to examine how and 
why they occurred. Along these lines, severe criticism has been raised by 
Kuperman who asserts that, “the 2011 intervention and NATO’s 
subsequent actions, prolonged the war’s duration about sixfold, increased 
the death toll up to tenfold, worsened human rights abuses and 
humanitarian suffering, fed Islamic radicalism and led to weapons 
proliferation in Libya and its neighbours.”97  
 
These factual observations strongly suggest that the NATO coalition 
overstepped its UN mandate and that its military intervention in Libya - 
under the name of humanitarian protection - proved to be a serious set-
back for the doctrine of R2P. It further demonstrates Hobson’s contention 
that good intentions for humanitarian protection might not always lead to 
just outcomes.98 The Libyan case refreshed old disputes regarding the 
nuances of the use of force to protect populations and raised concerns 
among scholars who worry that R2P’s foothold is not sufficiently strong to 
95 ibid. 
96 ibid p.6. 
97 Alan J. Kuperman, "A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing NATOs Libya Campaign," 
International Security 38, no. 1 (2013):133, as quoted in, Ramesh Thakur, "The Responsibility to Protect at 
15." International Affairs 92, no. 2 (2016): 425. 
98 Christopher Hobson, "Responding to Failure: The Responsibility to Protect after Libya," Millennium: Journal 
of International Studies 44, no. 3 (2016): 451. 
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influence the interests and actions of intervening states. The extensive 
literature on the debate around R2P’s implementation in Libya can be 
divided into broad groups: the first includes scholars like O’Shea who 
directly challenge the military dimension specified under pillar III of the 
R2P doctrine, while the second group includes proponents of R2P such as 
Thakur and Paris, that remain optimistic about what force can achieve in 
terms of protection of civilians.  
 
In her analysis, O’Shea proclaims that the interests of the NATO members 
defined the priorities of their intervention in Libya and therefore, the 
pursuit of regime change under the auspices of humanitarian intervention 
verified the age old fear that doctrines such as R2P would always be put to 
“nefarious use by the powerful”.99 With the impression that R2P has 
effectively become a tool for Western interventionism and neo-
imperialism, she concludes that, “the application of coercive action to 
grave humanitarian crisis are tempting, but they rarely solve anything.”100 
Therefore, she advocates for policy makers to focus only on peaceful 
methods to resolve a conflict. However, according to Paris, “if the coercive 
instruments of R2P are abandoned or rejected, the doctrine would likely 
be discredited and dismissed as hollow, because there would be no 
prospect of military action to uphold the principles of human protection, 
99 Elizabeth O’Shea, "Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in Libya: Ghosts of the Past Haunting the Future 
*," International Human Rights Law Review 1, no. 1 (2012), as quoted in Alex J. Bellamy, "The Responsibility 
to Protect: Added value or hot air?" Cooperation and Conflict 48, no. 3 (2013): 11. 
100 Elizabeth O’Shea, "Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in Libya: Ghosts of the Past Haunting the Future 
*," International Human Rights Law Review 1, no. 1 (2012): 188. 
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even in the most extreme crises.”101 In reality, policy makers cannot adopt 
a passive attitude in light of grave humanitarian situations where peaceful 
negotiations have failed. This contention has also been acknowledged in 
the theoretical debates around Just War Theory -  “violence is evil, but so 
is inaction in the face of great injustice.”102 Thus, the use of coercive action 
in certain cases can be necessary as it might be the only means to avert an 
even greater evil of human rights violations. In this way, R2P is “trapped 
by its own internal logic.”103 In a similar vein as O’Shea, Ramesh Thakur 
also criticizes the military intervention in Libya on the grounds that the 
NATO-led coalition ‘over-interpreted UN authorization to protect civilians’ 
in a ‘transparent effort’ to achieve regime change, yet, unlike O’Shea, 
Thakur does not have a problem with the military dimension of the 
doctrine and perceives it to be a necessary option but limited to a ‘last 
resort’.104 Thakur stresses the need for “establishing legitimacy criteria to 
guide decisions on authorizing and overseeing international military 
intervention”105, which could then serve as a justification for exercising 
force. Developing on Thakur’s point, as the Just War Tradition laid down 
certain constrains for states resorting to the use of force- both with regard 
to the reasons for going to war and the manner in which that war is 
conducted, military interventions under the name of humanitarian 
101Roland Paris, "The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and the Structural Problems of Preventive Humanitarian 
Intervention," International Peacekeeping 21, no. 5 (2014): 593. 
102 Nicholas J. Wheeler, "Legitimating Humanitarian Intervention: Principles and Procedures," Melbourne 
Journal of International Law 2 (2001):554. 
103 ibid. 
104 Ramesh Thakur, "R2P after Libya and Syria: Engaging Emerging Powers," The Washington Quarterly 36, no. 
2 (2013): 70. 
105 ibid. p.61. 
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protection should also legitimately justify principles of warfare.  
The legitimacy criterions were spelled out by the ICISS report in 2001 
(although not yet formally adopted by the UNGA or the UNSC) and 
developed upon the Just War Theory. The first criterion is the presence of 
just cause for military intervention for human protection purposes.106 The 
second criterion is that there must be a right intention, which means that 
the predominant motive of the intervening state must be for humanitarian 
protection, regardless of any other motive they may have.107 The third 
criterion is last resort, that no lesser measure of peaceful resolution is 
available or likely to be effective in averting a conflict.108 The fourth is that 
any military response be “proportional to the scale of the threat: doing that 
which is necessary, and no more than that, to deter any future use of 
chemical weapons.”109 The final criterion of legitimacy, or prudence, is the 
“balance of consequences: that any military response does not put those 
who are meant to be protected in even greater peril.”110 Although the 
majority of these criterions were flouted in the Libyan intervention, Evans 
claims that, “the future moral and prudential case for military action 
depends on every one of these criteria being satisfied.”111 These criterions 
based on the classical and revisionist approach of just war theory offer a 
good threshold for the authorization of military intervention and 
106 Gareth Evans, "R2P down but not out after Libya and Syria," Open Democracy, September 9, 2013. 
107 ibid. 
108 ibid. 
109 Ramesh Thakur, "R2P after Libya and Syria: Engaging Emerging Powers," The Washington Quarterly 36, no. 
2 (2013): 70. 
110 ibid. p.61 
111 Gareth Evans, "R2P down but not out after Libya and Syria," Open Democracy, September 9, 2013. 
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combating the use of force for humanitarian protection, and further entail 
the capacity to legitimize and strengthen R2P’s existing framework. 
To conclude, the military intervention that was aimed at protecting Libyan 
civilians transmogrified into something more consequential and expansive 
primarily due to the de-facto transformation of NATO’s intentions, and its 
methods of implementing R2P. However, the conceptualization around the 
doctrine of R2P is changing, in part as a result of Libya, but also due to the 
evident disagreement among the UNSC members about “how the norm is 
to be applied in the hardest of sharp end cases, those where prevention has 
manifestly failed, where the harm to civilians being experienced or feared 
is so great that the issue of military force simply has to be given at least 
some prima facie consideration.”112 Henceforth, the essential lesson that 
can be drawn from the Libyan crisis for the practical implementation of 
R2P is that firstly, there is an urgent need for the intervening forces to 
align their strategies in a way that prioritizes the prevention of atrocity 
crimes over their political or geo-strategic interests. Secondly, it is 
essential for the UNSC to develop greater accountability mechanisms for 
those participating in military interventions. These mechanisms are to 
ensure that prior to authorizing the use of coercive action in a particular 
situation, the legitimacy criterions (as described above) are satisfied and 
that at no point during the intervention do the self-interests of the 
intervening forces come into conflict with the humanitarian objectives. It 
112 Cecilia Jacob and Marly-Louise Hickey, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Domestic Processes and 
Foreign Assistance, ANU College of Asia & the Pacific, Australian National University (2017), 9. 
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will further provide a system of checks and balances that examines the 
progress of the intervention and enhances the accountability, 
transparency, and consistency of the mission. In a similar manner, the 
mechanism will also ensure that despite authorizing military 
interventions, negotiation offers put forward by either side involved in a 
civil war are explored and not instantly shrugged away. Thirdly, a clause 
for impartiality and neutrality must be introduced in resolutions 
authorizing military interventions under the R2P doctrine. The following 
chapter will reveal that by empowering the rebels, the NATO forces 
unintentionally or unknowingly carved out Libya’s future pathway, which 
left the country embroiled in waves of extremism and violence.  
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Chapter III-The post-intervention mayhem in Libya 
 
On the 20th of October 2011, the despotic leader Colonel Muammar 
Gaddafi was dreadfully killed by the forces of NTC, paving the way for 
NATO’s triumph in its seven-month air campaign against Libya. Following 
his demise, waves of celebrations sparked among Libyans as well as 
amongst the advocates of military intervention who hailed the mission as 
successful, signifying a ‘textbook case for R2P’.113 The Prime Minister of 
the NTC government, Mahmoud Jibril expressed his happiness during a 
press conference by stating, “we have been waiting for this moment for a 
long time.”114 In his speech, British Prime Minister David Cameron lauded 
NATO’s operation and claimed that “the death of the toppled dictator has 
provided the Libyan people with a greater chance of building themselves a 
strong and a better democratic future.”115 He was extremely proud of the 
role played by Britain in liberating the people of Libya.116 President Obama 
praised Gaddafi’s death as a foreign policy success and remarked, “the 
Libyans had won their revolution and the dark shadow of tyranny has been 
lifted.”117 Even the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, boasted about 
Libya’s intervention by enunciating, “We came, we saw, he died.”118 With 
113 Ramesh Thakur, "R2P after Libya and Syria: Engaging Emerging Powers," The Washington Quarterly 36, no. 
2 (2013): 62. 
114 James Meikle, "Muammar Gaddafi is dead, says Libyan PM," The Guardian, October 21, 2011, accessed 
September 22, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/20/gaddafi-dead-says-libyan-pm. 
115 Independent, "Gaddafi death hailed by David Cameron," October 20, 2011, accessed September 22, 2017, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/gaddafi-death-hailed-by-david-cameron-2373468.html 
116 ibid. 
117 Ewen MacAskill, "Obama hails death of Muammar Gaddafi as foreign policy succes," The Guardian, October 
21, 2011, accessed September 22, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/20/obama-hails-death-
gaddafi. 
118 Daily Mail Australia, "We came, we saw, he died: What Hillary Clinton told news reporter moments after 
hearing of Gaddafi's death ," October 21, 2011, , accessed September 22, 2017, 
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visible relief, the U.N. Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon proclaimed that 
the day of Gaddafi's death marked an “historic transition for the people of 
Libya.”119  
 
With these appraisals and a relatively quick victory, the NATO forces 
pulled out from Libya in less than two weeks after the killing of the ousted 
dictator. Although the NTC repeatedly requested that NATO stay for a 
longer period and provide assistance in the country’s democratic 
transition, the coalition was rather eager to exit.120  The NATO leaders 
emphasised the need to withdraw quickly due to the financial austerities 
hovering over their countries. In order to deal with the economic crisis, 
Europe and the US slashed their defence budgets as a part of public 
spending cuts and thus, upon the completion of their mission they had no 
reason to stay any further.121 Hence, even though the initial application of 
R2P in Libya did much to boost the doctrine’s standing, the gains appear 
to have broken down or reversed, in the handling of the post-conflict 
transition. In short, the undermining of the overall success of NATO’s 
operation largely accrued from “the failure of the international community 
to complement military action with robust assistance in critical areas - 
including disarmament, national reconciliation, and employment 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2051826/We-came-saw-died-What-Hillary-Clinton-told-news-
reporter-moments-hearing-Gaddafis-death.html. 
119 Emily Fox, "Colonel Gaddafi is dead," Express, October 20, 2011, accessed September 22, 2017, 
http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/278623/Colonel-Gaddafi-is-dead. 
120 Seumas Milne, "If the Libyan war was about saving lives, it was a catastrophic failure," The Guardian, 
October 27, 2011, accessed September 14, 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/oct/26/libya-war-saving-lives-catastrophic-failure. 
121 Andrew Dorman et al., "The Implications of Military Spending Cuts for NATO’s Largest Members," ed. Clara 
Marina O’Donnell, Brookings Institution: Analysis Paper, July 2012, 13. 
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generation - which collectively constitute the “Responsibility to 
Rebuild”(R2R).”122  
 
State-Building and R2P 
 
The concept of R2R was specified under the remits of the original ICISS 
report on R2P, but not included in either the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document or the 2009 UN Secretary General’s Report.123 
However, in many respects, the R2R is one of the most important parts of 
R2P because it requires intervening actors to develop a clear and effective 
post-intervention strategy. It recommends that the intervening parties 
should provide security in post-intervention states, promote reconciliation 
between former rival groupings and assist with economic development.124 
While it is much easier to generate international consensus around the 
need to engage in rebuilding after armed conflict than it is to forge 
consensus on prevention or reaction, the practice of rebuilding 
nonetheless remains controversial. In academia, there are certain scholars 
who have questioned whether there is a link at all between the doctrine of 
R2P and the practice of rebuilding.125 This is primarily because, “they 
believe that considerations of jus post bellum do not play any moral role in 
122 Ethan Chorin, "NATO's Libya Intervention and the continued case for a "Responsibility to Rebuild"," Boston 
University of International Law 31, no. 365 (2013): 366. 
123 ibid p.367, also see United Nations General Assembly, “World Summit Outcome”, A/RES/60/1, 24th October 
2005. And United Nations General Assembly, “Implementing Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-
General”, 63rd Session, 12th January 2009. 
124 Ethan Chorin, "NATO's Libya Intervention and the continued case for a "Responsibility to Rebuild"," Boston 
University of International Law 31, no. 365 (2013): 366. 
125Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities, 1st ed. (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2009), 167. 
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the justifiability of a war.”126 But in reality, there is a clear link between 
assistance for rebuilding institutions, the rule of law, and shattered 
economies and the strengthening of state sovereignty.127 Another set of 
criticism has been raised by cosmopolitan writers like Daniel Warner128 
and Mark Duffield129 who argue that, “even though the doctrine of R2P 
recognises the fact that state sovereignty can propagate insecurity, its 
solution is simply to replace one type of state with another, whilst leaving 
the principle of state sovereignty intact.”130 In response to such arguments, 
Bellamy asserts that, “this is exactly what R2P advocates - the idea that the 
best way to protect civilians from genocide and mass atrocities is through 
an international society of responsible states - and it is only through 
commitment to rebuilding that the doctrine engages directly with the 
question of how one builds a world of responsible states.”131 Developing on 
Bellamy’s point, the practice of rebuilding strengthens the sovereignty of a 
state, ensures that it follows the path of development and prevents the re-
occurrence of violence, which is fulfilling the commitments of R2P in its 
true sense. The importance of rebuilding measures have also been 
highlighted by Ban Ki-Moon in his 2012 report, “The Responsibility to 
126 James Pattison, "Jus Post Bellum and the Responsibility to Rebuild," British Journal of Political Science, 
2013, 643. 
127 Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities, 1st ed. (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2009), 167. 
128 Daniel Warner, "The Responsibility to Protect and Irresponsible, Cynical Engagement," Millennium: Journal 
of International Studies 32, no. 1 (2003):110. 
129 Mark R. Duffield, Development, security and unending war: governing the world of peoples (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2013), 123. 
130 Daniel Warner, "The Responsibility to Protect and Irresponsible, Cynical Engagement," Millennium: Journal 
of International Studies 32, no. 1 (2003):110. And Mark R. Duffield, Development, security and unending war: 
governing the world of peoples (Cambridge: Polity, 2013), 123, as quoted in Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to 
Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities, 1st ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 167. 
131 Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities, 1st ed. (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2009), 169. 
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Protect: Timely and Decisive Responsive”, where he explained that R2P 
might include, “building the institutions, legislation, practices and 
attitudes to lessen the likelihood of…[atrocity] reoccurrence.”132 
 
The extension of peace operations directed at re-establishing order in 
conflict prone territories has been widely criticized by Paris who believes 
that, “international peace-builders have adopted the ‘principles of liberal 
democracy and market-oriented economics’ in an attempt to transfer the 
Western liberal-democratic institutions, values and norms to the weak, 
peripheral countries. In this context, state-building may be seen as a 
contemporary version of ‘mission civilisatrice’ through which colonial 
imperial powers sought to ‘civilise’ their former colonies.”133 This 
involvement of external actors in state building efforts as an adjunct to 
peacekeeping operations, with embedded liberalism has also been 
condemned by Ottaway who argues that “external actors do not pay 
attention to the complex difficulties standing in the way of effective state-
building and make promises without being able to fulfil them.”134 He 
further “warns against efforts that are over-ambitious and under-
resourced.”135 While such concerns are genuine, the risks of not 
undertaking efforts to rebuild as a part of R2P’s implementation have 
132 United Nations Security Council and General Assembly, "Report of the Secretary General- Responsibility to 
protect: timely and decisive response", A/66/874–S/2012/578, 25th July 2012. 
133 Roland Paris, "International peacebuilding and the ‘mission civilisatrice’," Review of International Studies 
28, no. 04 (2002): 639. See also, Noureddine Jebnoun, "Beyond the mayhem: debating key dilemmas in Libya's 
statebuilding," The Journal of North African Studies 20, no. 5 (2015): 833. 
134 Marina Ottaway, "Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States," Development and Change 33, no. 5, 
2002, as quoted in, Noureddine Jebnoun, "Beyond the mayhem: debating key dilemmas in Libya's 
statebuilding," The Journal of North African Studies 20, no. 5 (2015): 834. 
135 ibid. 
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clearly emerged in Libya. As a result of western powers’ neglect of the need 
for developing or implementing a consensual and inclusive state-building 
approach, the state has been traumatically absent from post-Gaddafi Libya 
till today and the country has been engulfed by the myriad of conflicts 
among different factions. 
 
The new dynamics of Libya 
  
Political Dimension 
 
With the immediate withdrawal of NATO, the control swiftly slipped into 
the hands of the rebels who began to perpetrate scores of reprisal killings, 
in addition to torturing, beating, and arbitrarily detaining thousands of 
suspected Gaddafi followers.136 At first, the 51 member NTC commenced 
preparations for democratic elections in order to form a new government 
that entailed the responsibility of drafting a resolution and bringing 
security to the state of Libya. However, these efforts soon came to an 
abrupt end as the NTC was plagued with internal divisions, which made it 
unfit to resolve the country’s existing problems or address serious issues of 
national reconciliation and unity. In addition to the NTC’s inefficiency, the 
fallout from Libya unleashed various warring factions, which until then 
had been marginal or suppressed by the Gaddafi regime. Their sudden 
136 Maggie Michael, “Rights Group: Libyan Rebels Executed Gaddaa Loyalists,” Washington Post, October 18, 
2012, as quoted in Alan J. Kuperman, "A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing NATOs Libya 
Campaign," International Security 38, no. 1 (2013): 125. 
 
49 
                                                 
emergence resulted in competing groups jostling for power along with the 
large scale proliferation of extremist fighters. Consequently, instead of 
transitioning into a democracy, the country descended into complete 
lawlessness.  
 
In the absence of an organised military and government the security 
situation rapidly deteriorated, with frequent occurrences of violence 
between rival groups which were heavily armed as they had gained access 
to the old regime’s stockpiles.137 The power vacuum left behind now serves 
as a breeding ground for all sorts of radical factions, from al- Qaeda-
affiliated groups to the Islamic State. In fact, these groups promote 
themselves as the most credible defenders of the country from outside 
forces. The most evident demonstration of this notion came about as early 
as September 2012, when Islamist militants “armed with anti-aircraft 
weapons and rocket-propelled grenades stormed the United States 
diplomatic mission in Benghazi.”138 The attack, which killed the American 
ambassador and three members of his staff, exacerbated the chaos and 
sparked a firestorm of recrimination in the country.139 
 
The only positive development in post-war Libya was the democratic 
elections of 2012 in which more than 100 political parties registered. The 
137 Christopher Hobson, "Responding to Failure: The Responsibility to Protect after Libya," Millennium: Journal 
of International Studies 44, no. 3 (2016): 449. 
138 David D. Kirkpatrick and Steven Lee Myers, "Libya Attack Brings Challenges for U.S," The New York Times, 
September 12, 2012, accessed September 22, 2017, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/13/world/middleeast/us-envoy-to-libya-is-reported-killed.html?mcubz=0. 
139 ibid. 
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elections brought to power a moderate, secular coalition government 
through an interim 200-member national assembly.  The main purpose of 
this new assembly was to replace the unelected NTC, elect a Prime 
Minister and establish a committee for a draft constitution. After several 
delays in the voting, the General National Congress finally replaced the 
NTC on the 8th of August 2012. Nonetheless, amid escalating conflict and 
increasing regional rivalries, the country’s first democratic elections failed 
to secure a peaceful future for its citizens. This setback was bound to 
happen as Gaddafi left behind a country with no established or credible 
governmental institutions or political parties; a dependent civil society; no 
awareness about individual civil rights; no freedom of expression or justice 
system; a one-track economy, which was wholly dependent on revenues 
from oil exports; and a system of national administration that was based 
on family ties, patronage and corruption. 
 
In the midst of the political mayhem, a second civil war broke out in the 
summer of 2014 (still on-going) among rival groups seeking control of the 
Libyan territory. This was partly due to political fragmentation and partly 
due to the structure of Gaddafi’s dictatorship. At the beginning of the civil 
war, the political scenario of Libya was divided into two main groups, 
which functioned with their own governments, their own parliaments, and 
controlled separate fractions of territory and militia. On one side, was the 
government of the House of Representatives (HoR) elected democratically 
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in 2014, also recognised as the “Tobruk government” and internationally 
known as the “Libyan government.” On the other side, was the government 
endorsed by the General National Congress, which is popularly known as 
the “National Salvation Government” and is based in the capital, Tripoli. 
Witnessing the intensification of violence in Libya, the UN brokered peace 
talks and proposed the establishment of the Government National Accord 
as Libya’s new unity government in 2016. Although Libya now has three 
governments, none are able to govern and the country is embroiled in a 
civil war with ISIS, which continues to expand its operations in different 
regions. This growing influence of terrorists also poses a direct threat to 
the very authority of the Libyan state.  
 
Economic Dimension 
 
The disintegration of Gaddafi’s regime and lack of state-building efforts 
undertaken by the NATO forces has not only fractured Libya’s political 
dimension but also its economic dimension. A central pillar of Gaddafi’s 
administration was the redistribution of wealth and oil profits but his 
demise has precipitated the worst-case economic scenario for the country. 
New companies such as Exxon Mobile and British Petroleum have been 
granted hefty oil concessions, and neither of them are interested in 
carrying out an equitable redistribution of wealth across the Libyan 
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society.140 The country’s economy and finances are already showing signs 
of fatigue and rapid decline, as the country’s production of oil - its 
lifeblood - remains severely depressed by the protracted conflict. In 
December 2016, “Libya’s oil output plummeted from 1.4 million barrels 
per day to only 160,000 barrels per day.”141 In addition, due to a weak 
central government and lack of proper administrative structure, Libya now 
has an expansive black market network for oil, the sales from which have 
been skyrocketing.142 According to a World Bank report, “Libya’s economy 
is near collapse as the civil war worsens and bank reserves plunge.”143 The 
report further reveals that Libya’s economy has shrunk majorly in the past 
few years and with oil exports down, the bulk of the country’s 6 million-
strong population depends on fast-depleting foreign reserves.144 This has 
been reaffirmed by the National Oil Corporation (NOC) that claims, “oil 
sector closures have cumulatively cost over $100 billion in lost revenues 
from oil exports since 2013, resulting, according to the Central Bank of 
Libya, in a fiscal deficit of 56 per cent of GDP for both 2015 and 2016.”145 
The Bank’s foreign-currency reserves are estimated to have decreased 
below $40 billion, compared to $75 billion in March 2015.146 Libya’s 
140 Garikai Chengu, "Libya: From Africa’s Richest State Under Gaddafi, to Failed State After NATO 
Intervention," Global Research, September 14, 2016, accessed August 4, 2017. 
141 Eric Blanco Niyitunga, "The Greatest African Leaders: Muammar Gaddafi," Joburg Post Online , December 2, 
2016, accessed September 28, 2017, https://www.joburgpost.co.za/2016/12/02/the-greatest-african-leaders-
muammar-gaddafi/. 
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Intervention," Global Research, September 14, 2016, , accessed August 4, 2017. 
143 http://www.businessinsider.com/libyas-economy-collapse-civil-war-2016-10?IR=T 
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turbulent political development has dragged its economy along and 
plunged it more than ever before. The economic glitches that hover around 
Libya demand a political settlement but with power being contested by 
three rival governments and a fast-disintegrating administration, any sort 
of reforms are likely to be unsuccessful. As a matter of fact, as long as oil 
production, which is the major profit generator of the Libyan economy, is 
held to ransom to achieve political gains by varying groups, the odds of an 
economic collapse remain high.147  
 
Why no strategy for state-building in post-intervention Libya? 
 
In order to analyze why the international community failed to undertake 
post-intervention state-building measures in Libya, it is important to 
briefly trace the practical dilemmas associated with the principles of R2R. 
Firstly, there is no agreed or set definition of state-building and neither do 
the principles provide a specific framework to implement rebuilding 
strategies in post-conflict situations. Over a period of time, scholars and 
policy makers have developed their own interpretation of what state-
building entails. According to Fukuyama, state-building refers to the 
formation of new governmental institutions and strengthening the pre-
existing ones.148 Within the predominant context of state development, 
147 Mohsin Khan and Svetlana Milbert, "Libya: Facing Economic Collapse in 2014," Atlantic Council, January 23, 
2014, accessed September 27, 2017, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/libya-facing-economic-
collapse-in-2014. 
148 Francis Fukuyama, "The Imperative of State Building," Journal of Democracy 15, no. 2 (2004): 17, as quoted 
in Noureddine Jebnoun, "Beyond the mayhem: debating key dilemmas in Libya's statebuilding," The Journal of 
North African Studies 20, no. 5 (2015): 833. 
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which focuses on economic liberalisation and market based approaches, 
Fukuyama distinguishes “state-building from ‘good-governance’, in light of 
the weak and dysfunctional institutions in developing countries.”149 He 
considers failing states as a major threat to the international community 
and therefore, persuades powerful states to build “effective political 
institutions in weak states as a prerequisite for economic progress and 
international security.”150 These sentiments have been echoed by Fritz and 
Menocal, who believe that state-building implies a more explicit awareness 
of the political nature of institution-building.151 In simplistic terms, “state-
building is about constructing the foundations of the very (government) 
edifice within which governance ought to operate.” 152 However, scholars 
like Brahimi believe that the process of state-building entails a close 
relationship between institutionalisation and democratisation, and they 
cannot be segregated.153 In this sense, rebuilding efforts require 
“constitution-making, electoral processes, reintegration and national 
reconciliation and rule of law”.154 The success of state-building depends on 
the political institutionalisation of democratic principles and values.155 The 
lack of consensus, complexity attached with the concept and absence of 
any basic structure to guide R2R efforts have made intervening states 
149 ibid. 
150 ibid. 
151 Verena Fritz and Alina Rocha Menocal, "Understanding State-Building from a Political Economy 
Perspective," Report for DFID’s Effective and Fragile States Teams: overseas Development Institute, 2007, 4. 
152 ibid. 
153 Lakhdar Brahimi, “State Building in Crisis and Post-Conflict Countries.” 7th Global Forum on Reinventing 
Government: Building Trust in Government, Vienna, Austria, June 2007,26-29, as quoted in Noureddine 
Jebnoun, "Beyond the mayhem: debating key dilemmas in Libya's statebuilding," The Journal of North African 
Studies 20, no. 5 (2015): 833. 
154 ibid. 
155 ibid. 
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apprehensive to undertake rebuilding efforts. Secondly, the process of 
rebuilding is a long and costly endeavour, and this serves as a 
disadvantage in persuading states to provide the necessary resources over 
a long period of time.156  
 
The coalition’s failure to meet its “Responsibility to Rebuild” in Libya 
accrues from both the practical dilemmas listed above, although it owes a 
little more to the second problem. In the contemporary time, the 
international community has undertaken state-building efforts in war-torn 
countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo, among many others. But the 
fact that rebuilding after a military intervention required large 
expenditures of capital and an undefined time commitment, made it 
difficult for the NATO members to stay on in Libya and provide 
developmental assistance.157 This is primarily because at that time, NATO 
was overly involved in Afghanistan and Iraq, and thus, it did not posses 
adequate resources, which would have allowed it to take on a new project 
of state-building. Moreover, as international supporters lacked consensus 
around appropriate state-building strategies, they attempted to do far too 
much in Afghanistan.158 This over-ambition, extended their time 
commitment, augmented their investments and made it difficult for them 
to exit the country. It also created a sense of fear and resistance regarding 
156 Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities, 1st ed. (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2009), 169. 
157 Ethan Chorin, "NATO's Libya Intervention and the continued case for a "Responsibility to Rebuild"," Boston 
University of International Law 31, no. 365 (2013): 378-379. 
158 William Maley, "Statebuilding in Afghanistan: challenges and pathologies," Central Asian Survey 32, no. 3 
(2013): 266. 
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any future state-building efforts, which could transform into a replication 
of Afghanistan.159 Moreover, in light of the political turmoil in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, the NATO leaders did not want to meddle with the internal 
affairs of another Middle-Eastern country. Consequently, the drafters of 
Resolution 1973 were most concerned with establishing consensus around 
the military intervention through air strikes, with no boots on the ground, 
which limited their engagement and responsibility. 
 
The reactions of the international community to Libya’s 
instability 
 
Libya’s rapid decent into chaos raised concerns among the entire 
international community. The reports of American intelligence agencies 
offered wide-ranging estimates last year on the number of Islamic State 
fighters in Libya with some assessments topping 5,000 militants.160 The 
head of the Pentagon’s African Command, Gen. Thomas D. Waldhauser, 
stated, “the instability in Libya and North Africa may be the most 
significant near-term threat to U.S. and allies’ interests on the 
continent.”161 Similarly, counter-terrorism officers in the Metropolitan 
Police are increasingly worried that the “so-called Islamic State’s foothold 
in Libya could become a second springboard, after Syria, for attacks on the 
159 ibid. 
160 Eric Schmitt, "ISIS Remains Threat in Libya Despite Defeat in Surt, U.S. Officials Say," The New York Times, 
December 8, 2016, accessed September 1, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/08/us/politics/libya-isis-
sirte.html. 
161 Eric Schmitt, "Warnings of a ‘Powder Keg’ in Libya as ISIS Regroups," The New York Times, March 21, 2017, 
accessed September 1, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/21/world/africa/libya-
isis.html?mcubz=0&mcubz=0. 
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UK and the rest of Europe.”162  In a draft resolution proposed by the 
International Contact Group on Libya, the group reiterated its “concern 
about the increasing terrorist threats in the country and the ever 
increasing expansion of terrorist groups like Islamic State (IS)."163 
Furthermore, worried about the volatility and human rights situation in 
Libya, the Secretary General’s Special Representative cautioned “that the 
country risked a return to wide-spread conflict.”164 In an interview with 
Fox News, President Obama expressed regret over, “failing to prepare for 
the aftermath of the ousting of the Libyan leader” and described it as the 
“worst mistake of his presidency.”165 With these apprehensions and 
distress about the situation in Libya, there is a widespread recognition that 
Libya is stuck in a political limbo and there is an urgent need to find a 
political settlement among groups jostling for power and authority.  
 
The Lesson from Libya 
 
The NATO coalition and the entire international community has 
acknowledged their failure to provide necessary state-building assistance 
in order to prevent the reoccurrence of violence in Libya. But the practical 
dilemmas associated with R2R and the lessons learnt through their 
162 Frank Gardner, "Islamic State foothold in Libya poses threat to Europe," BBC News, February 11, 2016, , 
accessed September 23, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-35533787. 
163 The Africa Report, “Libya crisis worries international community," January 29, 2016, accessed September 23, 
2017, http://www.theafricareport.com/North-Africa/libya-crisis-worries-international-community.html. 
164 United Nations Security Council, 7927th Meeting, "Libya Could Relapse into Conflict, Secretary-General’s 
Special Representative Warns, Citing Volatile Security, Human Rights Situation" SC/12799, April 19, 2017, 
accessed September 23, 2017, https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12799.doc.htm. 
165 BBC News, "President Obama: Libya aftermath 'worst mistake' of presidency," April 11, 2016, accessed 
September 2, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-36013703. 
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previous state-building efforts have developed a state-building fatigue 
among the international community, which is now less willing to engage in 
military intervention because they know that they will have to stay back 
and provide appropriate assistance. In this sense, R2R might serve as a 
disincentive for the members to further their engagement in cases of mass 
atrocities or political mayhem. Therefore, the lesson that can be learnt 
from Libya is that there is dire need for the international community to 
formulate state-building strategies, which will allow them to engage in 
protective intervention, given the limited amount of resources. To provide 
assistance with resilience-building in conflict affected societies, the 
international community can undertake a range of measures such as, 
encouraging dialogue between communities; persuading various rival 
groups to redistribute power and the resources of the country; controlling 
hate speech; allowing a gradual pace of economic liberalization; and 
annually assessing the local dynamics of the country to ensure its progress 
on the path of peace. These measures do not require a huge amount of 
resources and can be undertaken by a team of competent, as well as 
dedicated, members of the international community that are well 
cognizant of the country’s past, its complexities, and its problems.  
 
In a similar manner, the UN (based on the state contributions) could also 
assume certain responsibilities - firstly, it should ensure that its resources 
are not completely flushed out due to over-commitments on other projects 
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and there is a reserve maintained for cases of emergency like Libya. 
Secondly, state-building efforts could also be assumed by representatives 
from the UN that can provide guidance regarding the country’s election 
procedure, constitution making, and government formation. These cost-
effective measures, which could further help in stabilizing post-conflict 
situations, include: the presence of a small UN peacekeeping force; the 
dispatching of a UN political stabilization mission; and small scale civil-
military assistance. 
 
To conclude, the problem at present is that R2R articulated in the ICISS 
report suggests long term engagement for state-building, and lengthy 
commitments of ground forces and peacekeeping forces. However, this 
form of R2R has the capability to undermine the doctrine of R2P. But if 
R2R is approached in the ways suggested above and addresses the 
immediate problems faced by states in the wake of military interventions, 
it not only has the potential to strengthen the R2P framework, but also to 
regain acceptance from member countries that have been reluctant to 
embrace the doctrine. The R2R should therefore not be ignored by the 
belligerent states. This importance of rebuilding has also been highlighted 
by the just post bellum principle of Just War Theory and if incorporated 
within R2P’s present structure it will further provide legitimacy to the 
doctrine. 
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Chapter IV- The International Community’s response to the 
lessons learnt in Libya 
 
The Libyan experiment not only wounded R2P but also limited the 
willingness in much of the global south, particularly among the BRICS 
countries to support any propositions that effectively, if implicitly 
recognized the legitimacy of humanitarian protection under certain 
circumstances.  Such mounting apprehensions were bluntly expressed by 
India’s ambassador to the UN - Hardeep Singh Puri, who stated that, 
“Libya gave R2P a bad name.”166 Even the former UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan, admitted that “the way R2P was used in Libya caused a 
problem for the concept.”167 The NATO coalition’s interpretation and 
execution of R2P in 2011 has further exacerbated the UNSC’s impasse over 
the appropriate and effective measures for humanitarian protection in 
Syria. Till today, the recalcitrance of Russia and China has made it 
impossible for a collective action to be undertaken against Syria. This is in 
part due to their political and geo-strategic motives - Russia has a long 
history of ties with the Assad regime - and also in part due to their fear 
that powerful western countries will use coercive action to pursue their 
imperialistic policies. As Paris points out, their continuous use of veto to 
166Bolopion, Philippe. "After Libya, the question: To protect or depose?" August 25, 2011. Accessed August 25, 
2017. http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/25/opinion/la-oe-bolopion-libya-responsibility-t20110825, as 
quoted in John W. Dietrich, "R2P and Intervention after Libya," Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the 
Social Sciences 5, no. 2 (2013): 346. 
 167Natalie Nougayrcde, 'Kofi Annan: "Sur la Syrie, aL'6vidence, Nous N'avons Pas R6ussi'' [Interview with 
Kofi Annan: 'on Syria, It's Obvious, We Haven't Succeeded'], as quoted in Andrew Garwood-Gowers, "The 
Responsibility to Protect and the Arab Spring: Libya as the Exception, Syria as the Norm?" UNSW Law 
Journal 36, no. 2 (2013): 610. 
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reject even a weak UNSC resolution for civilian protection in Syria, has 
“prompted some observers to characterize the international deadlock on 
Syria ‘as payback’ for the Libya intervention. .168  
 
The controversies of the Libyan intervention have also brought the 
longstanding limitations of the collective security system to the limelight. 
For instance, questions have been raised on the inconsistency and 
selectivity of the Council’s actions, the delegation of the authority to use 
force, the hierarchical differentiation within the Council and the 
accountability of its members.169 Although, an extensive analysis and 
subsequent arguments for UNSC reform falls beyond the scope of this 
thesis, it will first briefly place the debate in context and then analyze how 
the international community incorporated these reforms in their 
initiatives developed to improve R2P’s normative standing post-Libya.  
 
As originally defined in the UN Charter, composition and decision making 
procedures of the UNSC have come under widespread criticism ever since 
its establishment in 1946, even though it remains one of the UN’s major 
successes as it overcame the essential weakness of the League of Nations, 
namely lack of authority. A large part of the criticism is due to the 
 168 Walter Russell Mead, ‘The Wilsonian World Order Has Once Again Been Postponed’, The American 
Interest website, 5 Oct. 2011 http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2011/ 10/05/the-wilsonian-world-
order-has-once-again-been-postponed. See also Stephen M. Walt, ‘Will Victory in Libya Cause Defeat in Syria?’, 
Foreign Policy website, 6 Feb. 2012 http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/02/06/the_libyan_precedent, 
as quoted in Roland Paris, "The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and the Structural Problems of Preventive 
Humanitarian Intervention," International Peacekeeping 21, no. 5 (2014): 587. 
169 Oliver Stuenkel and Marcos Tourinho, "Regulating intervention: Brazil and the responsibility to 
protect," Conflict, Security & Development 1, no. 4 (2014): 394. 
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structure of the Council that many believe is undemocratic especially 
because it gives considerable authority and privileges to the five most 
powerful countries of the world. Thus, demands were made to extend the 
membership of the Council, which would break the traditional hierarchy of 
the P5 sitting on top of the pyramid and limit their ability to use veto as a 
tool for protecting their national interests. In recent years, the case for 
strengthening the UNSC has gained greater momentum, mainly due to the 
fact that its members are now more actively engaged in dealing with 
situations of global peace and security. As a result, many advocates of 
reform have argued that improving the working methods of the UNSC and 
establishing institutional mechanisms for accountability are as important 
as the expansion of the Council, and restricting the use of veto power.  
 
These proclamations have been highlighted by Tourinho, Stuenkel, and 
Brockmeir, who believe that apart from the privileges of veto power of the 
P5 members, the problem of informal differentiation is at the centre of the 
UNSC’s problematic operating procedures.170 Inevitably, “the elected 
members or the non-P5 members are excluded from many informal 
negotiations where, in practice, many of the important decisions are taken 
and therefore, they do not share the knowledge of any past agreements.”171 
According to Henderson, the interpretation of the UN charter powers has 
led to the development of “a method for ‘authorizing’ states and coalitions 
170 Marcos Tourinho, Oliver Stuenkel, and Sarah Brockmeier, " “Responsibility while Protecting”: Reforming 
R2P Implementation," Global Society 30, no. 1 (2016): 147. 
171 ibid. 
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of states to use coercive measures in order to fulfil their responsibility for 
the maintenance of international peace and security.”172 Although, over the 
years, “this method has become embedded into the working practices of 
the Council, there is a deficit in the accountability of the UNSC members 
in both its development and utilization of it.”173 He further advocates for 
structural and/or procedural reform that could solve many of the problems 
associated with the working procedures of the UNSC and rectify, or at least 
minimize, “the use or abuse of the authorization method, both in terms of 
transparency and accountability.”174 As a supporter of the reform, 
Lehmann also perceives that the UNSC suffers from a major problem 
where the working methods employed by its members are “highly 
politicized.”175 In furtherance to these arguments, over the past few years, 
the UN member states and civil society actors have continuously put 
forward their demands for voluntary restraint on the use of the veto power 
by the P5 members in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, or 
large-scale war crimes. These calls for voluntary restraint of the veto in 
mass atrocity situations have also been made by the UN Secretary General, 
Deputy Secretary General, High Commissioner for Human Rights and the 
Special Advisers for Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to 
Protect.176 While these contentions suggest that reform of the UNSC is 
172 Christian Henderson, "Authority without Accountability? The UN Security Council’s Authorization Method 
and Institutional Mechanisms of Accountability," Journal of Conflict & Security Law 19, no. 3 (2014): 399. 
173 ibid. 
174 ibid. 
175 Volker Lehmann, "Reforming the Working Methods of the UN Security Council: The Next ACT," Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung, August 2013, 7. 
176 Global Centre for Responsibility to Protect, UN Security Council Code of Conduct, 
http://www.globalr2p.org/our_work/un_security_council_code_of_conduct 
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needed to improve the collective security system for humanitarian 
purposes, Banteka, claims “that a reformed UNSC would hinder the 
crystallization of R2P as a customary norm and its application to 
humanitarian crises.”177 This is particularly the case because, “the potential 
UNSC reform is likely to give space to more political and regional power 
play than before, which would further decrease the capacity of the UNSC 
to invoke R2P.”178 
 
The military intervention in Libya and its problematical aftermath forced 
an amplification of these debates, and a reassessment of the extent to 
which the collective security apparatus, including the use of coercive 
action, is appropriate or sufficient to address these problems.179 In 
response to the controversies spurred by the Libyan intervention, and the 
toxic political discussions described above, Brazilian diplomats led by then 
External Relations Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota prepared a 
concept note entitled “Responsibility While Protecting: Elements for the 
Development and Promotion of a Concept.” 
Brazilian Initiative: Responsibility While Protecting 
The proposal, “Responsibility while Protecting” (RwP) was presented by 
Brazil to the UNSC in November 2011 as a conscious effort to ensure that 
177 Nadia Banteka, "Dangerous Liaisons: The Responsibility to Protect and a Reform of the U.N. Security 
Council," Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 54, no. 382 (2016): 423. 
178 ibid. 
179 Jennifer Welsh, “Civilian Protection in Libya: Putting Coercion and Controversy Back into RtoP”, Ethics & 
International Affairs 25, no. 3 (2011):255–262, as quoted in Marcos Tourinho, Oliver Stuenkel, and Sarah 
Brockmeier, " “Responsibility while Protecting”: Reforming R2P Implementation," Global Society 30, no. 1 
(2016): 148. 
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the use of coercive action for civilian protection purposes produces 
minimum violence and instability. It entailed three major substantive 
elements. First, “it recommended that the three pillars of R2P “must follow 
a strict line of political subordination and chronological sequencing, and 
adhere to safeguards against unwarranted coercion.”180 Second, it 
highlighted the need to establish a more prudent criteria for the 
authorization of coercive action for humanitarian purposes as specified 
under pillar III of the R2P.181 Third, “it called for better monitoring of the 
manner in which resolutions are interpreted and implemented, and 
stronger accountability measure for those who are granted the authority to 
use force while protecting.”182 
 
The Brazilian initiative was initially met with a tepid response by the P3 
members and some of the policy makers who were unclear about whether 
RwP should be understood as an alternative to R2P or whether it should 
be seen as complementary to the doctrine.183 The United States, France, 
and the United Kingdom refused to agree that the R2P doctrine remained 
unaffected by the new concept. Therefore, they were reluctant to discuss 
the establishment of a new criteria or greater accountability 
180 United Nations General Assembly Sixty Sixth Session, Letter dated 9 November 2011 from the Permanent 
Representative of Brazil to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, 2011, A/66/551–S/2011/701. 
See also, Paula Wojcikiewicz Almeida, "Brazilian View of Responsibility to Protect," Global Responsibility to 
Protect 6, no. 1 (2014):47. 
181 ibid. 
182 United Nations General Assembly Sixty Sixth Session, Letter dated 9 November 2011 from the Permanent 
Representative of Brazil to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, 2011, A/66/551–S/2011/701. 
See also Edward Newman, "R2P: Implications for World Order," Global Responsibility to Protect 5, no. 3 
(2013): 250. 
183 Marcos Tourinho, Oliver Stuenkel, and Sarah Brockmeier, " “Responsibility while Protecting”: Reforming 
R2P Implementation," Global Society 30, no. 1 (2016): 140. 
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mechanisms.184 However, the concept eventually evolved through 
subsequent discussions that took place in the diplomatic circles and gained 
substantive attention in academia as well. While, some scholars consider 
RwP as a significant concept, there are others who have remained 
apprehensive towards it. With reference to R2P as an existing 
international norm, Acharya asserted, “the Brazilian initiative attests to 
the working of ‘norm subsidiarity’, a form of normative agency which 
occurs when the weaker elements in the international system seek to 
protect the integrity of an existing international norm ‘from dominance, 
neglect, violation, or abuse by more powerful central actors.’”185 This view 
resonates with those put forward by Western and Goldstein, “mitigating 
concerns that R2P will be misused, RwP might help the international 
community strike the right balance between maintaining the support of 
the UNSC and effectively responding to mass atrocities in a timely 
manner.”186 In his analysis, Morris applauded the Brazilian initiative by 
describing it as a “‘constructive, conceptual contribution’ to the debate on 
protection of civilians and R2P.”187 However, negating these arguments, 
Bachman perceives RwP as incompetent.188 He points out that, “though 
well-intended, Brazil’s proposal is ultimately short-sighted, primarily 
because, RwP cannot overcome the ulterior motives problem or the 
184 ibid. 
185 Amitav Acharya, "The R2P and Norm Diffusion: Towards A Framework of Norm Circulation," Global 
Responsibility to Protect 5, no. 4 (2013): 477. 
186 John Western and Joshua S. Goldstein, "R2P After Syria," Foreign Affairs, 2013. 
187 Justin Morris, "Libya and Syria: R2P and the spectre of the swinging pendulum," International Affairs 89, 
no. 5 (2013): 1279. 
188 Jeffrey Bachman, "R2P’s “Ulterior Motive Exemption” and the Failure to Protect in Libya," Politics and 
Governance 3, no. 4 (2015): 64. 
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accountability vacuum, which is unfortunate because accountability could 
be one of the only means to minimizing the ulterior motive problem.”189  
Likewise, taking a more stronger stand against RwP, Avezov pronounced, 
“while it is politically incorrect to say so, intervention is often guided by a 
calculation of economic, political, and human costs to the intervener. The 
concept of RwP realistically does not address these costs of intervention 
and how they influence the decision to intervene.” 190 
With a critical analysis of these arguments, it can be substantiated that the 
ideas articulated in the Brazilian proposal provided an important starting 
point for advancing a debate on the use of coercive action and R2P at a 
time when discussions were extremely polarized. Further, the structure of 
debate established by the Brazilian proposal tried to narrow the gap 
between the ‘West and the Rest’ by allowing “for the participation of a wide 
range of states and civil society actors that belong to more diverse 
backgrounds than just traditional R2P advocates, such as, fellow BRICS 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) or the G77.”191  As an 
appreciation of the Brazilian effort and upon realizing its importance, the 
concept of RwP was included in the UN Secretary General’s report, ‘Report 
of the Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect: Timely and 
Decisive Response’ in July 2012. However, while the concept was 
extensively debated, by mid 2012, Brazil gradually retreated in its more 
189 ibid. 
190 Xenia Avezov, "'Responsibility while protecting': are we asking the wrong questions?" Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, January 30, 2013, https://www.sipri.org/node/409. 
191 Marcos Tourinho, Oliver Stuenkel, and Sarah Brockmeier, " “Responsibility while Protecting”: Reforming 
R2P Implementation," Global Society 30, no. 1 (2016): 141. 
 
68 
                                                 
explicit pursuit of developing RwP as a concrete diplomatic initiative. 
Firstly, despite the generalized acceptance of the concept, the UNSC’s 
deadlock over Syria continued to linger. Secondly, there were several 
questions that were left unanswered such as, how can threshold be 
established for limiting action by the Council without a mechanism to 
control the legality of its resolutions? What kind of accountability or 
monitoring mechanisms were needed? How would it be possible to control 
the use of force by states authorized under the UNSC resolutions?192 
Therefore, RwP was never sufficiently developed to formulate into a 
specific concept that could address the problems associated with collective 
security and humanitarian protection in practice.  
As RwP lacked a concrete plan to be initiated, France came to the forefront 
with a new strategy in order to endure the discussions about enhancing the 
Council’s accountability and building consensus around pillar III’s 
application in Syria.  
French-Mexico Initiative: Code of Conduct 
In the midst of the growing debates about humanitarian protection and 
the increasing mass atrocities in Syria, another constructive proposal 
which offered some real hope for a UNSC reform was initiated by France. 
Since October 2011, Russia and China have used their veto power to stall 
any serious efforts to address crimes against humanity and war crimes 
 192 Paula Wojcikiewicz Almeida, "Brazilian View of Responsibility To Protect," Global Responsibility to 
Protect 6, no. 1 (2014): 62. 
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committed against the Syrian civilians. These two members of the UNSC 
have exercised their veto numerous times- Russia (eight) and China (six, 
plus one abstention) on resolutions aimed at resolving the Syrian conflict 
or even those suggesting an arms embargo against the Assad regime.193 
The Syrian conflict which began in 2011 is now in its seventh year and has 
killed over 460,000 lives.194 However, the UNSC constrained by vetoes, 
proved to be powerless in the face of Syrian tragedy, which has further 
undermined its legitimacy. Moreover, the ability of the P5 members to 
over-ride the mandates of the UNSC and initiate war under the guise of 
humanitarian protection has arguably sabotaged the perception of the 
Council as a neutral and impartial arbitrator, and thus its credibility 
among the international community. 
As a response to the irresponsible use of veto by the UNSC  members, the 
President of French Republic, François Hollande, articulated in 2013 that 
“the five permanent members of the UNSC— China, France, Russia, 
Britain and the United States — themselves could voluntarily regulate their 
right to exercise their veto.”195 It further specified that, “if the UNSC were 
required to make a decision with regard to a mass crime, the permanent 
members would agree to suspend their right to veto.”196 In 2014, France 
and Mexico collaborated to take this initiative a step ahead by organising a 
193 Global Centre for Responsibility to Protect, UN Security Council Code of Conduct, 
http://www.globalr2p.org/our_work/un_security_council_code_of_conduct 
194 ibid. 
195 Laurent Fabius, "A Call for Self-Restraint at the U.N.," The New York Times, October 4, 2013, accessed 
September 30, 2017, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/04/opinion/a-call-for-self-restraint-at-the-
un.html?mcubz=0. 
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ministerial meeting on the issue. The co-chairs of the meeting, the French 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Development, Laurent 
Fabius, and his Mexican counterpart José Antonio Meade Kuribreña, 
called on the P5 to “voluntarily and collectively pledge not to use the veto 
in case of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes on a large 
scale.”197 According to the recommended framework, the UN Secretary 
General entailed the authority to determine whether the situation amounts 
to one of the mass atrocity crimes, if necessary at the request of the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights or of 50 UN member states.198 In 
the following year, France with the support of Mexico launched a “political 
declaration on suspension of veto powers in cases of mass atrocities which 
focused only on the P5 members and called for their voluntary restraint of 
the use of veto.”199  
The Declaration is supported by 96 member states. However, Beijing and 
Moscow view the proposal as a rebuke for their behaviour over Syria and 
are not willing to be a part of it. The U.S. has show almost equal 
reluctance. Hence, apart from France, none of the other four permanent 
members of the UNSC - the United States, China, Britain and Russia, have 
formally signed up for the initiative.200  
The France-Mexico initiative further provided a headway for the ACT 
197 United Nations Security Council, "UN Security Council Working Methods: The Veto", 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/the-veto.php ,13th April 2017. 
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199 Global Centre for Responsibility to Protect, "Political Declaration on Suspension of Veto Powers in Cases of 
Mass Atrocities", http://www.globalr2p.org/resources/889, 1st August 2015. 
200 United Nations Security Council, "UN Security Council Working Methods: The Veto", 
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Group which was established in 2013 with an aim to improve the 
Accountability, Coherence and Transparency of the UNSC. It sought to 
address both the Council’s  internal functioning as well as its relations to 
the broader UN membership.201 In 2015, the ACT Group launched a “Code 
of Conduct” regarding the UNSC’s action against genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes. The Code of Conduct suggests all members of 
the UNSC, elected and permanent, to not vote against any credible draft 
resolution intended to prevent or halt mass atrocities.202 Albeit, the 
support of 114 member states and 2 observers, the ACT group’s Code of 
Conduct has not generated much of a hustle bustle among the 
international community or even in the academia. 
Did the International Community learn its lesson in Libya? 
 
There is no doubt that both these initiatives- RwP and the restraining of 
the veto power- came about as serious efforts to rectify the long-standing 
ills of the UNSC as far as humanitarian protection was concerned. 
However, it would be too ambitious to state that the international 
community has yet learnt its lesson from the military intervention in 
Libya. This is particularly because both these initiatives are still struggling- 
either to gain substantive support or being implemented in a way they are 
201Centre for UN Reform, The Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group – Better Working Methods 
for today’s UN Security Council-Fact Sheet, 
http://centerforunreform.org/sites/default/files/FACT%20SHEET%20ACT%20June%202015.pdf, 25th June 
2015. 
202 Global Centre For Responsibility to Protect, "Political Declaration on Suspension of Veto Powers in Cases of 
Mass Atrocities", http://www.globalr2p.org/resources/889, 1st August 2015. 
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supposed to. In support of this argument, the remainder of this chapter 
critically assesses the two initiatives and highlights the loopholes they 
suffer from.  
            The failures of RwP 
In order to evaluate the concept of RwP, it is important to understand its 
foundation and Brazil’s aim behind stepping up its role when the UNSC 
reached a stalemate over the Syrian tragedy. While, RwP can certainly be 
considered as a reaction to the perceived abuse of the Libyan intervention 
and the severe consequences of exercising forceful measures that have 
aggravated existing conflicts, it was not the only reason that motivated 
Brazil. This has been underlined by Almeida, “this new strategy of RwP 
can be considered a direct outcome of alleged excesses committed during 
the implementation of Resolution 1973 but it is also an indirect 
consequence of Brazil’s willingness to obtain a permanent seat on the 
Council, since its mandate as a non-permanent member was to end on 31 
December 2011.”203 Therefore, through the framework of RwP, Brazil 
aspired to improve its international standing and actively participate in 
actions taken within the UN. This further became clear in august 2012, 
when as a response to the growing apprehensions towards the concept, the 
Brazilian Minister of foreign Affairs stated, “that Brazilian diplomats do 
not intend to further develop the idea of RwP in order to clarify it to the 
203 Paula Wojcikiewicz Almeida, "Brazilian View of Responsibility To Protect," Global Responsibility to 
Protect 6, no. 1 (2014): 45. 
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international community.”204 He also stressed “that Brazil does not seek to 
impose a solution but rather to garner the opinions of other countries with 
respect to its proposal, and to rebuild consensus around situations 
involving R2P.”205 Moreover, the Brazilian diplomats were satisfied with 
the inclusion of their initiative into the UN agenda and the fact that it was 
being welcomed by the broader international community. If Brazil was 
really committed to resolving the problems associated with humanitarian 
intervention and work on the lessons learnt in Libya, it should have started 
to tackle the serious questions that were being asked regarding RwP, 
instead of pulling out from the discussions. In a way, Brazil conveniently 
shrugged the responsibility when its purpose of improving its 
“international image” was accomplished. 
In addition, the concept of RwP strictly maintained that military 
interventions should not be guided by political or strategic motives of the 
decision makers. It also criticized the R2P doctrine by indicating that, 
“there is a growing perception that the concept of the responsibility to 
protect might be misused for purposes other than protecting civilians, 
such as regime change. This perception may make it even more difficult to 
attain the protection objectives pursued by the international 
community.”206 Based on this analysis, one can say that if the international 
community had learnt its lesson in Libya and if the concept of RwP was 
204 ibid p.63. 
205 ibid. 
206 United Nations General Assembly Sixty Sixth Session, Letter dated 9 November 2011 from the Permanent 
Representative of Brazil to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, 2011, A/66/551–S/2011/701 
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really consequential for authorization of the use of coercive action then, 
the Syrian crisis would not have become such a tragic situation. Despite 
intensified discussions on RwP, Russia and China have prioritized their 
political and geostrategic motives over humanitarian protection in Syria 
and continued to block any UN resolution that can impair their 
relationship with the Assad regime. The impact of military intervention in 
Libya has proved to be extremely disastrous but despite that, the members 
of the UNSC are willing to exercise R2P as a tool for their self interest-
clearly the lesson has not been learnt. 
         The Failure of ‘Code of Conduct’ 
On the other hand, the French-Mexican initiative, which called upon the 
P5 members to restrain their use of veto powers in the face of mass 
atrocities, has not been able to garner adequate support. Only two of the 
P5 members- France and the United Kingdom are willing to advocate or 
even spearhead the initiative. This is primarily because the P5 members 
are not interested in relinquishing their power by constraining the use of 
veto. Similar divisions are also evident in the UNGA over the ACT Code of 
Conduct where members have expressed concerns about the proposal on 
the grounds that it is too ambitious, and could stifle meaningful, albeit less 
far reaching, change. These states believe that the proposal has not gone 
far enough, as in, it should have been extended from mass atrocity 
situations to include veto restrain in regard to the UN Secretary General 
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selection and requests that are being made for the UN membership.207 
While, the Libyan crisis clearly indicated the need for a constructive ‘West 
and the Rest’ dialogue for  future military interventions and progress of 
the R2P doctrine, the divisions among the UNSC or even the UNGA over 
the ‘restrain the veto campaign’ (which can make a real difference as far as 
humanitarian protection is concerned), showcase their reluctance to 
undertake any measures for improving R2P. More interestingly, in order 
to pursue their political and strategic interests, the P5 members continue 
to exercise their veto power as they deem necessary. In April 2017, Russia 
vetoed a UN resolution “that would have condemned the suspected use of 
chemical weapons in northern Syria and demanded a speedy 
investigation.”208 
To conclude, these gaps, such as the members pursuing their political and 
strategic interests, aiming for regime change through the disguise of R2P, 
exercising veto despite grave humanitarian situations, divisions among the 
UNSC or the UNGA members- all prove that the international community 
has not learnt its lesson from the 2011 intervention.  
 
 
 
207 Ethan Chorin, "NATO's Libya Intervention and the continued case for a "Responsibility to Rebuild"," Boston 
University of International Law 31, no. 365 (2013): 386. 
208 Al-Jazeera, "Russia slammed for vetoing yet another Syria resolution," April 13, 2017, accessed September 
28, 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/russia-veto-syria-resolution-170413004627326.html. 
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Conclusion 
 
The Libyan military intervention was a litmus test for the principles of R2P 
and in some ways served as the greatest achievement for the doctrine since 
an overt threat that raised genuine concerns about the possibility of 
imminent human rights violations was countered quickly and decisively. 
Yet, it has also proved to be a major hindrance for the doctrine, displaying 
the pathologies of its interpretation and implementation by the 
intervening forces as I have highlighted in this thesis. The three main 
lessons that can be carved out from R2P’s implementation in Libya can be 
summarized as: reforming the UNSC’s practices, which paves a way for the 
development of a collective approach to respond to mass atrocity 
situations; prioritization of the prevention of atrocity crimes and 
humanitarian protection motives over the intervening state’s political or 
geo-strategic interests; and the extension of R2P doctrine to include R2R, 
which urges the intervening state to provide some sort of post-intervention 
state-building assistance to conflict affected societies.  
The setbacks of the military intervention in Libya calls for a stricter 
enforcement of R2P’s criteria of last resort and proportionality, and 
greater accountability in operation conducted in defence of the 
international norm. These gaps can be filled by a serious reflection on the 
ethical and practical considerations regarding the use of force that has 
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been specified by the Just War Tradition and with their incorporation into 
R2P’s human security paradigm, which values respect, security and 
development for the protection of innocent civilians. The principles of Just 
War Theory provide a strong foundation for R2P to develop into a true 
exception to the prohibition on the use of force, allowing the possibility of 
force in response to heinous crimes. It further offers a framework for 
understanding where R2P’s application may or may not be legitimate, 
which could possibly serve as a stronger case for the acceptance and 
widespread recognition of the doctrine. In addition, it levies upon the 
intervening state the responsibility to rebuild peace and a minimal status 
quo in the conflict prone zone. The responsibility of the international 
community to provide assistance for the process of state reconstruction 
after an intervention in the name of R2P, as specified by the jus post 
bellum principle of the Just War Theory could represent another moral 
justification of military intervention under the humanitarian protection 
doctrine.  
In summation, the doctrine of R2P is an important development of the 
contemporary period, particularly due to mass human rights violations in 
countries like Libya and Syria. Nonetheless, despite its emergence as an 
important norm within the IR discipline, it lacks moral and ethical 
justification, accountability frameworks, and appropriate political will for 
combating warfare in cases of humanitarian protection. Therefore, 
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successful future application of R2P requires the international community 
to undertake serious and collective efforts to resolve the problems 
associated with the doctrine’s application in Libya, and draw upon the 
principles of the Just War Tradition, which will provide a moral 
justification for military interventions. This would make the doctrine of 
R2P more legitimate and applicable. 
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